Post-Cold War Russia/West relations: U.S. Foreign policy initiatives, sources of friction, and prospects for the future by Lasica, Kristen Anne.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-06
Post-Cold War Russia/West relations: U.S. Foreign




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
POST-COLD WAR RUSSIA/WEST RELATIONS: 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, SOURCES OF 
FRICTION, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
by 
Rristen Anne Lasica 
June 2001 
Thesis Co-Advisors: Donald Abenheim 
Mikhail Tsypkin 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
20011123 000 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the 
time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters 
Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, 
VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503.  
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 
June 2001 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Post Cold-War Russia/West Relations: U.S. Foreign 
Policy Initiatives, Sources of Friction, and Prospects for the Future 
6. AUTHOR(S) Lasica, Kristen Anne 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
EPORT NUMBER 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
This study analyzes U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward Russia between 1993-2000. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the West found itself in a period of global transition during 
which they had an opportunity to redefine the post-Cold War security arena and secure enduring 
peace and cooperation between historically adversarial blocs. The key to creating this system was 
immediate, full-fledged Russian inclusion. Yet due to remaining Cold War-biases and misaligned 
U.S. policies, Russia has become alienated from the West. 
Russia's newfound isolation is the result of an evolving process that has begun to 
destabilize global security. The failure of structurally and financially inadequate economic 
reforms led to Russia's catastrophic 1998 market crash, provided Russians with a scapegoat, and 
helped silence reformers. The expansion of NATO showed Russia that it had no part in the 
West's newly envisioned security system. Furthermore, the Kosovo campaign nullified Russia's 
UN veto and consequent global influence, armed NATO's threatening encroachment, and 
bolstered a Russian, anti-Western body politic. 
Consequently, the West must reassess its current stance and set Russian inclusion as its 
first priority, for history suggests that without Russia, there is can be no stability in Europe. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 'Russia, Soviet Union, NATO, Military Doctrine, Security Policy, Post-Cold 
War, Security Arena, National Missile Defense, Expansion, Economic Reform, Kosovo Campaign, 













15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES    166 




SN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
U 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
POST-COLD WAR RUSSIA/WEST RELATIONS: 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, SOURCES OF FRICTION, AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Kristen Anne Lasica 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.A., Tulane University, 1995 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2001 
Author: 
Approved by: (XJbudJfa c_ 
Donald Abenheiin/föo-Advisor 
James J. Wirtz, Chairman 
Department of National Security Affairs 
in 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward Russia between 1993- 
2000. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the West found itself in a period of global 
transition during which they had an opportunity to redefine the post-Cold War security 
arena and secure enduring peace and cooperation between historically adversarial blocs. 
The key to creating this system was immediate, full-fledged Russian inclusion. Yet due 
to remaining Cold War-biases and misaligned U.S. policies, Russia has become alienated 
from the West. 
Russia's newfound isolation is the result of an evolving process that has begun to 
destabilize global security. The failure of structurally and financially inadequate 
economic reforms led to Russia's catastrophic 1998 market crash, provided Russians with 
a scapegoat, and helped silence reformers. The expansion of NATO showed Russia that 
it had no part in the West's newly envisioned security system. Furthermore, the Kosovo 
campaign nullified Russia's UN veto and consequent global influence, armed NATO's 
threatening encroachment, and bolstered a Russian, anti-Western body politic. 
Consequently, the West must reassess its current stance and set Russian inclusion 
as its first priority, for history suggests that without Russia, there is can be no stability in 
Europe. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study analyzes the three most prominent U.S. foreign policy initiatives 
toward Russia since the end of the Cold War - immediate economic reform, NATO 
expansion to the East, and the Kosovo campaign - in an attempt to identify the efficacy 
of such a policy and its utility in the future. 
Russia demonstrated its initial pro-Western, pro-democratic stance with reform 
efforts aimed to privatize the economy, democratize the government, and reorient the 
nation toward the West. Plagued with historical paranoia, debilitating corruption, and the 
desire to retain influence and prestige, Russian statecraft can still be described as one of 
naive cooperation toward the West. 
Conversely, U.S. attempts at global reorientation were undermined by a 
combination of Cold War hegemonic biases, by a reflexive distrust of Russian intentions, 
and by a preponderance of East European nations desiring Western security guarantees. 
Most Western policies, consequently, were based on rhetoric, and efforts at creating a 
peaceful arena seem to have gotten lost in the chaos of the time. 
Initial attempts at reform devastated the Russian economy, awakened recently 
silenced anti-Western impulses, and became - according to Russians - the reason for their 
nation's current predicament. The first round of NATO expansion proved to Russia that 
it had no role in the West's post-Cold War security system. Finally, the Kosovo 
campaign made Russia's UN veto ineffectual, neutralized the nation's position in world 
affairs, and transformed expansion into a veritable peril. In essence, U.S.-initiated 
Western policies have aided and abetted in transforming the psychological threat of 
xi 
Western exclusion into an armed menace that concerns not only Russian policymakers, 
but also the Russian body politic. 
Since 1991, hopeful Russian attitudes have been replaced with anti-Western 
inclinations and a severe loss in the influence of democratic reformers. This antagonistic 
predisposition is not a mere characteristic of extreme Russian politics, as anti-Western 
inclinations have created political coalitions that have altered Russian society. In 
essence, the West (with the United States in the lead) has alienated Russia from the newly 
defined, Western, post-Cold War security system. Russian isolation has in turn begun to 
destabilize European security. 
The West should well re-evaluate policy and strategy toward Russia. A way 
through which to satisfy Russia and quell East European fears must be created as history 
attests that a security system without Russia is bound to fail. The first post-Cold War 
decade is lost, but hopes for the future, though dim, are still present. The West must find 
a way to first include Russia, and then enshroud Eastern Europe with comprehensive 
security guarantees. If the situation is left unaltered, it is highly probable that this newly 
forged Russia/West rift will transition from that of being simply one of this era's 
characteristics, to being its defining feature. 
Xll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the twentieth century closed, an epoch of uncertainty arose in Europe. The 
Cold War's bipolar arena had given way to an erratic, multipolar world. The Clinton 
administration therefore found itself in a momentous period of promise and peril. World 
events had opened a window of opportunity during which the powers might shun 
historical stereotypes and an unparalleled rapport between the East and West might 
ensue. 
With Russians looking hopefully Westward in 1991, why now is the West faced 
with antagonistic, nationalist Russian attitudes reminiscent of those characteristic of the 
Cold War?1 
This study will attempt to answer this question through the analysis of U.S. 
foreign   policy   initiatives   toward   Russia   during   the    Clinton   administration.2 
1
 While acknowledging that blame must be proportionally allotted in every 
endeavor, in an effort to keep this study succinct and as a result of the limited availability 
of such analysis, this study will attempt to look at the immediate post-Cold War years 
from the point of view of both the Russian politic and public. 
2
 Among the leading sources used to formulate this study are: Black, J.L. Russia 
Faces NATO Expansion, Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, Craig, Gordon and George, 
Alexander. Force and Statecraft, Daalder, Ivo and O'Hanlon, Michael. Winning Ugly, 
de Wijk, Rob. NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, Judah, Tim. Kosovo - War 
and Revenge, Kaplan, Lawrence. The Long Entanglement, Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, 
Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms, Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement - 
Opinions and Options, Solomon, Gerald. The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997, 
Thomas, Ian. The Promise of Alliance, and The Cox Report, completed in September 
2000, was a congressional inquiry chaired by the Honorable Christopher Cox, at the 
request of House of Representatives Speaker of the 106th Congress, the Honorable Dennis 
Hastertt. The commission was composed of the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, as 
well as multiple area experts, and its purview was to investigate the Clinton 
administration' foreign policy in regard to Russia. 
1 
This periodization has been chosen for two reasons. First, it was during that period of 
time (1993-2000)3 that the center of gravity of U.S. economic and political initiatives 
toward Russia can be found. Second, the effects of immediate post-Cold War economic 
reform, the first round of NATO expansion,4 and the Kosovo campaign have had on 
Russia/West5 relations do not stand in isolation. Russia has adopted an anti-Western 
stance in economic, political, military, and strategic venues in open resistance to feeling 
threatened by the combined effects of these initiatives and in complete contrast with 
immediate post-Cold War attitudes. 
Russia's frustration with the West warrants attention because it is not merely 
reminiscent of extreme, communist, anti-Western rhetoric representative of the past seven 
decades. An unusual degree of Russian, anti-Western political equilibrium has 
permeated the public sector and created a veritable, anti-Western sentiment that crosses 
political and social boundaries. The effects of this newly awakened Western/Russian rift 
have manifested themselves in: a negative Russian political and public view of the West; 
the end of the tenure of Western-oriented reformers and constructive political debate on 
foreign-policy initiatives; an antagonistic Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
(2000) and National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (1998); a drive to create 
3
 This study defines 1993-2000 as the immediate post-Cold War era. 
4
 It is habitual for NATO, and consequently Western journalists to speak of 
NATO "enlargement." Russians continue to use the word "expansion" which is what this 
author will use without intending to sway the reader. 
5
 Instead of using East/West this study will utilize Russia/West since there is no 
longer a true "East," just Russia. 
new anti-Western partnerships on a plethora of levels, and an increasingly authoritarian 
government. 
This study will attempt to look at the causes and effects of this process of 
deterioration from the Russian point of view. For though these hostile views may seem 
to Westerners as being ridiculous and unfounded, to Russians they are more than a 
mindset; they represent the reality that the United States, through misdirected foreign 
policy, has neglected its share to aid in the redefinition of Russia's place in the new, 
international system of states. Understanding Russia's historical and psychological 
origins can therefore help to explain why the last decade has made Russians feel alienated 
from world affairs, and consequently pursue a course of isolation from the West. 
This thesis includes five chapters. The introductory chapter will provide an in- 
depth background to the situation at hand, including an explanation of initial U.S. and 
Russian postures towards each other and the remainder of the international community. 
The next three chapters, which make up the body of this study, will include both a 
description of the events at hand and their immediate and long-term effects on Russian 
relations with the United States, NATO, and the international community. Chapter two 
will concentrate on U.S.-led economic reform initiatives. Chapter three will deal with the 
way in which the United States led the realization of the first round of NATO expansion. 
Chapter four will examine U.S. policymaking with regard to NATO's Kosovo bombing 
campaign. The final chapter will include conclusions and recommendations for future 
policy. 
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II. ECONOMIC REFORM INITIATIVES 
Russia's economic reform - which was comprised of U.S.-initiated, bilateral 
policies conducted through programs carried out by various international organizations - 
was only one of numerous types of agendas initiated during the immediate post-Cold War 
era. Characteristic of much of the period, Russia looked to the West with naive, overly 
optimistic expectations, a complete lack of technical "know-how," and a propensity, in 
the end, to rely on corruption for economic, political, and social amelioration. At the 
time, the United States was preoccupied with domestic politics and satisfied with a policy 
based upon assertions of empty promises, a reliance on misperceptions, and a propensity 
to disregard failures and publicly praise shortcomings. This chapter is written in 
opposition to studies that state Russia is the cause of its own economic failures because 
of its reliance upon corruption and inexperience with alternatives to a command 
economy. It argues that together, Western approaches helped to crush economic reform 
initiatives, breed a phenomenally corrupt oligarchy, strip a people of first-ever hope for 
the future, and hamper chances for future economic, political, and strategic cooperation. 
This analysis also seeks to identify which steps should have been initiated in 
1993-95 in order to create a free-enterprise system. The collapse of communism in 
Russia provided the world with a first-ever opportunity to build a democratic, market 
infrastructure out of the remains of a command economy. Simply put, communism was 
to be replaced with a free-enterprise system. While the question of where and how to 
begin was yet to be answered, at the onset of reforms, the necessity to create the 
following fundamentals was clear: market-determined prices and production, binding, 
enforceable private contracts, individual ownership rights in land, private mortgage 
lending, commercial banking, uninhibited individual investment in "for-profit 
enterprises," and taxes light enough to minimize penalties on work, savings, investment, 
and risk taking.6 A discussion of why these fundamentals were disregarded and what 
was attempted in their stead can help explain why the Russian economy is in its present 
dismal state. 
This chapter begins with a general description of the immediate post-Cold War 
arena, including a brief description of the alignment of both the United States and Russia. 
Next follows an explanation of common Post-Cold War oversimplifications to include 
mutual misconceptions and the West's dependence upon both the "zero-sum game," and 
the idea of Russia's recreation in an image of the West. A quick Polish/zRussian 
comparison and a discussion about inadequate expertise will follow. After an 
illumination of the task ahead there will be a detailed description of initial reform 
programs to include an analysis of: the Troika, the Washington Consensus, shock 
therapy, and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Then, an in-depth description of the 
presence and handling of corruption will lead to an explanation of the rise in Russia's 
organized crime. An illumination of Russia's challenges with the demilitarization of its 
economy will lead directly to a discussion on weapons proliferation.    Finally, with 
6
 "Russia's Road to Corruption." The Cox Report. Available [Online]: 
[http://policy .house.gov/Russia/rullrussia/fullrussiatxt.html], p. 49, Feb 2001. 
6 
conclusions and recommendations, this study will discuss the emerging "cold peace" and 
hopes for the future as a lead in to a discussion on what course must be taken in order to: 
find "the Russian way." 
A.       GENERAL BACKGROUND 
It was evident as early as 1991 that Russia would have to pursue economic 
reform. Knowing nothing but communism, though, the nation did not advocate programs 
void of democratic transition. Instead, the fledgling nation chose to strive for the creation 
of a democratic market economy. Since Russia had waited centuries for this opportunity 
to join Europe and build a democratic system and market economy from within, the 
rapidity of reform seemed imperative to its advocates. Most Russians hoped to enjoy 
Western standards of living almost immediately following the collapse of communism.7 
Without a foundation to build upon, Russia naively prostrated itself to the West. After 
all, who better to turn to than the United States? The only remaining superpower and the 
leader of the democratic free world, had, by default, inherited the responsibility of 
assisting this transition. In essence, "U.S. midwifery" was necessary for the birth of the 
Russian market economy. 
7McFaul, Michael, "Getting Russia Right." Foreign Policy. Available [Online]: 
|>ttp://www.findartciles.com/cf_0/mll81/1999_Winter/58517714/print.jhtml], p. 8, Feb. 
2001. 
B.       RUSSIAN POSTURE 
Russia's history makes an instant metamorphosis from a command to a market 
economy an untenable goal. Interrelated threads of social, cultural, civic, economic, 
political, and strategic strength - all necessary for the creation of a democratic market 
economy - were absent in Russia at the dawn of its rebirth. The Soviet State had 
imposed a burden of indefensible security concerns upon its population and the 
organizational capacity of the state.8 Having spent its finances on building a military 
machine and empowering the ruling class, only miniscule fiscal remnants were spent on 
health, education, and social welfare. The USSR, large and arrogant, historically failed to 
engage the concerns of its population. The resulting society, void of private enterprise, 
civic structures, and legal codes was helplessly dependent upon the state for survival. 
Consequently, when the Soviet Union imploded, an immense ideological void was left in 
its wake, making Russia's rapid, democratic transition much more difficult. Returning to 
coercion and corruption became a tempting prospect because of the reformers failure to 
create fundamental democratic institutions such as civil society, a private sector, the rule 
of law, and social and political rudiments of a free-enterprise system. 
Russia needed a total bailout from impending economic collapse. The result of a 
common expectation that the United States would fix everything, was exactly what the 
nation sought. The Clinton administration's "Russia rhetoric" and numerous influential 
Westerners encouraged Yeltsin and his entourage at the onset of reforms in 1993 that 
8
 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri.    The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms. 
Washington D.C., (United States Institute of Peace Press: 2001), p. 22. 
8 
they would receive the following: large-scale Western credits, an immense amount of 
investment, and most importantly, Western acceptance of Yeltsin's Russia as the 
legitimate heir of the superpower attributes of the USSR, to include its sphere of 
influence.9 So while society enthusiastically hoped for recovery through partnership, 
exaggerated hopes drove the ruling elite to believe that Western subsidies would ensure 
its political survival.10 
C.      AMERICAN POSTURE 
As a result of his proclivity toward domestic politics, Clinton made no serious 
attempts to garnish public support for concrete, large-scale reform initiatives. In keeping 
with the spirit of the times, in the absence of concise action, the administration put 
powerful rhetorical emphasis on making significant financial assistance available to 
Russia for its transition. To Russia, such words were promises; to the United States, such 
narrative constituted intentionally hollow pledges. Policy characteristics aside, actual 
support for significant financial assistance would have been extremely difficult to obtain 
from Congress.11 
9
 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia 's Reforms, p. 592. 
10
 Ibid., p. 291. 
11
 Though counterfactual, if the President would have shown resolute leadership 
and an ability to conduct a meaningful lobby for support, history suggests that he might 
well have gained the support of the American public. 
In addition to a fundamental reluctance to provide fiscal augmentation, the 
situation in the United States was characterized by mass military restructuring in response 
to the end of the Cold War. The economy was in recession, military bases were closing, 
and the Department of Defense was in the process of executing significant cutbacks in 
personnel, equipment, and budget. The pendulum in the West was swinging back toward 
isolationism and Russia's problems seemed of little significance to many. Given the 
administration's propensity to see foreign policy as a mere auxiliary to domestic policy, 
the acquisition of sufficient unilateral capital was unlikely. The few within the United 
States Government who did fight for "Russian money" had to use intimidation methods 
based upon visions of a nuclear meltdown. Even the funds that were eventually 
appropriated were too little too late.12 The IMF and World Bank were consequently 
Russia's only hope for attaining massive financial aid. 
Estimates vary on how much money Russia would need to revive an economy 
that in 2001 is presently half of what it was a decade ago. The estimate given by Nikolai 
Shmelov in Voprosy Economiki puts the amount at $500 billion over a ten-year period. 
Some observers confer that $500 billion is far to great a price; especially in comparison 
to the $65 billion the West seems to have lost by lending or giving to Russia between 
1992 and 1999. When looked at in relation to: the trillions of dollars the United States 
spent attaining nuclear supremacy during the Cold War, the projected $836 billion to $1.9 
trillion U.S. budget surplus over the same period of time, and the monumental long-term 
12
 Tsypkin, Mikhail.   Seminar with Mikhail Tsypkin, 12 March 2001.   Naval 
Postgraduate School, Ca., Eastern National Security Affairs curriculum. 
10 
international security it could buy, some scholars attest that $500 billion is a temperate 
investment.13 
D.      POST-COLD WAR OVERSIMPLIFICATION 
In addition to misaligned policy initiatives, the West's entire outlook was plagued 
with "post-Cold War simplistic expectations."14 The United States secured the goal it 
had been striving to obtain since the debut of the Cold War - the ability to introduce 
quick, all-encompassing economic reform aimed at recreating Russia in the West's 
likeness.15 The utter complexity of the Russian situation, however, continues to make 
such oversimplification a dangerous proposition. Reformers in the East or West still do 
not understand the unique sensitivities the Russian experience brings to the fore. 
The underlying mistake made by the United States was assuming that Russia 
would react like the West when in reality it had no basis for doing so. Plagued by the 
tendency of looking at Russia through a prism of Western ideology,16 policymakers lost 
the conundrum created by Russia's 70 years of communist captivity. In order to 
understand Russia, one must put aside those preconceived notions and learn about both 
13
 Cohen, Stephen.   Failed Crusade.   New York, (W.W. Norton & Company: 
2000), p. 223. 
14
 Ibid., p. 106. 
15
 Wedel, Janine.    Aid to Russia.    Washington DC, (George Washington 
University Press: 1998), p. 1. 
16
 Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, p. 70. 
11 
the nation's past and present. For as Churchill stated, "Russia is a riddle wrapped inside 
an enigma"17 and if one neglects to first solve the puzzle inside, Russia will continue to 
remain a mystery. 
Four examples of such oversimplifications and misperceptions will be debunked 
here before proceeding with this study. The first explains U.S. infatuation with the "zero- 
sum game," the second addresses the characteristics that the Soviet economy willed to the 
"new Russia," the third clarifies the existence of a Russian/Polish comparison, and the 
fourth discusses the present lack of bilateral expertise. 
1. Zero-Sum Game 
Many economists stereotypically assigned Russia's economic choice as being a 
simple one between black and white. This reliance upon zero-sum tactics seriously 
exacerbated problems with regard to Western support and advocacy of economic reforms. 
It was increasingly common for Western reformers to equate Russian nationalism with 
conservatism and to place it alongside other anti-democratic, anti-reformist phenomena 
that appeared unattractive to the West.18 Individuals such as Yeltsin, Chubais, and 
Chernomyrdin were therefore seen as the only reformers available, when in reality they 
proved to be the real hard-liners in their unrelenting drive to impose policies that had 
little support in society.19   Other true reformers including Yevgeny Primakov, whose 
17
 Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, p. 69. 
18
 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri.   The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms, p. 
349. 
19
 Ibid., p. 629. 
12 
views did not guarantee viable solutions but remained influential, lacked political power 
and influence under Yeltsin and were essentially discredited and politically marginalized. 
What Western reformers failed to see was that the economic debate was not new; 
it had been ongoing for at least ten years. The real debate was consequently not between 
those in support of, or opposed to, reform, but rather between the proponents of different 
methods that were split along political and cultural lines. As Peter Reddaway, scholar of 
Soviet and Russian politics, states, "In any event, the cyclical paradigm of Russian 
history - in which top-down reformers have clashed with proponents of change from 
lower social strata - reproduced its zero-sum game: the radical freemarketeers (with 
support from the IMF and the Western governments) won and the democratic movement 
lost."20 
2.        "In the West's Likeness" 
The West's incapacity to understand the unique characteristics of Russia's 
immediate post-Cold War economy proved grave for reformers. In typical fashion, in an 
effort to fit Russia neatly into a "Western mold," oversimplification undermined true 
analysis. The hope that Russia's competitive market merely had to be awakened was 
destroyed by the reality that such a market never existed. The idea of an economy 
existing   without   an   underlying   market   infrastructure,   almost   inconceivable   for 
20
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Westerners,21 remains a defining characteristic of Russia's fiscal situation. Primarily due 
to ideological constraints, Russian authorities historically attached a low priority to 
making service and retail trade available to the public. As a result, Russia inherited one 
of the lowest store-to-consumer ratios in the developed world.22 Difficulties experiences 
in attempting to build a competitive, market economy were therefore intensified, as 
Russians have had virtually no foundation to build upon. 
3.        Russian/Polish Comparison 
Economists   have   often   compared   Russia's   possibilities   with   Poland's 
accomplishments, suggesting that Russia should follow suit and "jump-start" capitalism. 
Though helpful for analyzing certain stages of economic growth, one must realize that 
communism was instituted from within Russia, whereas it was imposed upon Poland. 
Private farming and a rudimentary market infrastructure had already existed in Poland,23 
whereas Russia's extra 25 years of "original" communism guaranteed that traces of a 
market system were almost non-existent.24 This bankruptcy of basic market foundations 
in Russia played an insurmountable role in the failure of Western reform initiatives. 
21
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4.        Lack of Sufficient Expertise 
The glaring educational deficiencies that continue to characterize the East and the 
West are both a cause and effect of these oversimplifications and misconceptions. From 
1992, Russian government officials lacked any knowledge on how to pursue democratic, 
economic reforms. Civic education projects and public policy schools were also very 
scarce. Furthermore, only a few organizations dedicated to distributing information 
about democracy could be found.25 With no historic foundation to build upon, Russians 
needed hands-on assistance and significant amounts of capital, in addition to basic 
instructions as to the nature of a democratic market economy and the requirements for 
ones establishment. 
The Russians, however, were not the only ones who lacked such knowledge. The 
same problem existed on the U.S. side where Americans understood neither the 
intricacies of a command economy, nor the communist remnants present in Russia. 
Generally, across the board, there existed a lack of understanding on the evolution of the 
Soviet Nomenklatura and the direct links between corruption, crime, tax evasion, and the 
path of economic transformation that was chosen.26 Additionally, at the onset of reforms, 
the United States had not yet invested sufficient resources into this area of expertise. In 
reality, after spending more than five decades trying to figure out how to defeat the 
Russians, very few took the time to study how to build a cooperative rapport with them. 
Consequently, those involved in reform from the beginning hadn't really studied 
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Russia.27 In-country training and expertise were sorely lacking. In contrast, most 
Western "experts" had experience working with the Third World, specifically Africa. 
Familiarity in the area of democratic consolidation and developmental economies was 
seen as sufficient. This debilitating naivete needlessly exacerbated both Russian and U.S. 
policy failures. 
E.      CHARACTERISTICS OF INITIAL REFORM PROGRAMS 
Though reform initiatives fluctuated rapidly on both sides, a base-line 
understanding of both Clinton and Yeltsin's initial policies is necessary as a starting point 
for analysis. The Clinton administration adopted the standard macroeconomic mindset of 
the IMF and World Bank with such priorities as: a) dramatic deficit reductions, b) tight 
monetary policies, c) price liberalization, d) aggressive privatization, e) sharp reductions 
in industry and agriculture subsidies, and e) the abolition of import restrictions.28 
Yeltsin, on the other hand, pushed for: the transfer of price-setting authority from state 
bureaucracies to semi-governmental trade monopolies, the freezing and devaluation of 
most savings accounts, the issuance of transferable vouchers to all citizens, and the 
privatization of most companies.29 
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1. The "Troika" 
The Western approach, based more on rhetoric than reality, was driven by 
President Clinton's attempts to delegate both the authority and responsibility of Russian 
policy decision making to a troika of subordinate officials: Strobe Talbott, Deputy 
Secretary of State, Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary and then Secretary of the 
Treasury, and Vice President Al Gore. This policy-making group was given the approval 
to act independent of normal checks and balances within the executive and legislative 
branches and consequently left the remainder of the government either unwilling or 
unable to assess the direction in which the policy was moving.30 The resulting 
disorganized and free-form nature of policymaking that developed independent of 
sufficient guidance from above had devastating effects on the development and execution 
of U. S. policy toward Russia.31 
2. The Washington Consensus 
Plagued with the necessity to believe in an ideal, universal, and preferably 
scientific solution to any problem, remnants of what was known as the "Washington 
Consensus"32 appeared to be the cure for Russia's economic ailment.   The program, 
30
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which became the underlying concept of most initiatives, attempted to base Russia's 
transition on what many economists term the "American experience."33 
Presenting a set of standard measures for economic policy based on monetarist 
theory, the Washington Consensus was designed for developing economies that were 
already based on the market. The main component of the doctrine was an effort to 
remove hurdles that stood in the way of market forces (privatizing the state sector and 
liberalizing domestic and international economic activity) and providing for financial 
stabilization.34 Such reforms apply Milton Friedman's ideas of favoring monetarism and 
unrestricted capital flows and have underpinned most of the work of the IMF and the 
World Bank in the 1990's.35 Simply put, the Washington Consensus is what necessitated 
that all reforms emphasize macroeconomics over the establishment of the fundamental 
preconditions for a free-enterprise economy.36 
There are two main problems with this "cookie-cutter approach:" one is that it is 
based on an egoistic, Western belief that if all countries follow the appropriate footsteps, 
they will reach Nirvana; the other is that it is too simplistic for Russia. The program is 
inutile for Russia for thee main reasons. First of all, post-communist Russia was not a 
market economy; market institutions were yet to be substituted for those of a planned 
economy.  Second, though Russia has roots as an industrial country, the allocation of its 
33
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resources was not in agreement with market principles.37 Third, Russia shares virtually 
no common historical characteristics with the developing Third World. It was clear that 
such stark differences needed to have been taken into consideration before prescribing a 
policy. Yet empowered by international funds, U.S. initiatives carelessly retained the 
above recipe for Russia's economy, which was unfortunately laced with residue from the 
Soviet Union's hybrid, Marxist, command system. In keeping with the Washington 
Consensus, Western efforts were focused on top-down, macroeconomic aspects of 
economic reform; and the absence of institutional preconditions for the proper 
functioning of a democratic economy was ignored. Even as negative effects were felt 
and policies necessitated altering, these underlying principles remained primarily 
consistent. 
3.        "Shock Therapy" 
These U.S.-initiated, top-down reform programs, often under the guise of shock 
therapy, were conducted without broad, Russian social consent. Based upon a marriage 
of sorts between a few senior members of each society, actual reform lost its significance 
to a necessity to blindly rationalize and support policy choices. There were several 
fundamental flaws in the Clinton administration's Russian policy that can be attributed to 
this unorthodox arrangement. According to the Cox Report, these flaws included: 
• Support for and dependence on a few individual Russian officials 
instead of a consistent and principled approach to policy that 
transcended personalities 
• A focus on the Russian executive branch to the exclusion of the 
legislature and regional governments 
37
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• An impatience with Russia's nascent democratic constituencies 
that led to attempts at democratic ends through decidedly non- 
democratic means 
• An unwillingness to let facts guide policy 
• A preference for strengthening Russia's central government rather 
than building a system of free enterprise 38 
Over-politicized and under-democratized, the system focused on strengthening 
the central government rather than building the fundamentals necessary for democracy. 
The consequences of these policy weaknesses were the administration's a) strikingly 
public support for Yeltsin and the executive branch, and b) indifference toward Russia's 
opposition parties and the legislature. As stated in a George Washington University 
journal entitled Aid to Russia: 
Instead of encouraging market reform, this rule by decree frustrated many 
market reforms as well as democratic decision making. Some reforms ... 
could be achieved by decree. But many other reforms advocated by 
USAID, the World Bank, and the IMF, ... depended on changes in law, 
public administration, or mindsets and required working with the full 
spectrum of legislative and market participants-not just one group.39 
F.       THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION 
During his first meeting with President Yeltsin, in April 1993, President Clinton 
delegated the management of U.S.-Russian relations to Vice President Al Gore. The 
U.S.-Russia Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation was to be co-chaired 
38
 "Russia's Road to Corruption." The Cox Report, p. 69. 
39
 Wedel, Janine. Aid to Russia, p. 3. 
20 
by Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. According to a 
joint statement signed at the summit, the first task of the U.S.-initiated commission was 
to promote cooperation between the United States and Russia on space and energy issues. 
Critics claim that eventually, the commission inherited the responsibility of determining 
all aspects of U.S. policy toward Russia.40 
Numerous fundamental flaws began to emerge during the first year of the 
Commission's origin - 1993. First of all, routine managerial responsibilities 
overshadowed necessary leadership. Strong, resolute, U.S. presidential leadership was 
vital in the midst of this historical period during which decisions could alter worldwide 
economic and security alignments. Second, by almost totally removing presidential 
guidance from the situation, the administration sent a formidable signal East that Russia 
was of secondary importance to the United States. Third, the formation of the committee 
and the rhetoric that followed seemed to be the only elements of importance to the 
administration. As a result, no coherent and farsighted, let alone successful U.S. policies 
toward Russia were championed.41 Lastly, with U.S. foreign policy based exclusively on 
Yeltsin and his handpicked entourage, other elected Russian leaders and their institutions, 
including the parliament, were virtually ostracized.42 The power and representation of 
the few operable democratic and legislative vehicles in Russia were consequently 
usurped. 
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1. Commission Operations 
The mode of operations of the commission, a direct by-product of its structure, 
consisted primarily of discussions between representatives from the Russian and 
American bureaucracies. As the years went by, the commission developed a Secretariat 
with numerous sub-committees comprised of respective working groups, subgroups, and 
assigned staffs established for the purpose of exchanging papers, distributing memoranda, 
and planning for additional meetings.43 Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, 
who became -in the words of The Washington Post - "the virtual day-to-däy manager of 
U.S. relations with Russia," headed the American component of the Secretariat. By 
substituting a bureaucrat whom the Post identified as an "obscure force in national 
security" in place of the vice president, - who himself was already a stand-in for Clinton 
- the importance of U.S. policy making for Russia was even further diminished.44 
Despite the commission's elaborate structure and the hundreds of people 
involved, it had no full-time professional staff. Instead, it relied on the principals to 
detail their own staffs as required. As a result, the preeminent forum for U.S.-Russian 
relations was both twice removed from the president and lacked a dedicated staff to give 
it full attention. Meeting only twice a year, the commission managed to produce a great 
deal of paper; the problem was that this written word proved to be superficial as it 
boasted few, if any successful initiatives. According to the Cox Report, "Not since the 
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days of the Soviet Union had the unrelenting issuance of so much government paperwork 
been viewed as a prime measure of achievement."45 
2.        Internal Corruption 
In the business of creating bureaucratic amenities in lieu of making real decisions, 
the commission's survival necessitated blind acceptance of deficiencies and public praise 
of shortcomings. This type of self-justification naturally grew to define the commission's 
efforts to retain Western support and IMF and World Bank Loans.46 Gore 
characteristically displayed reticence about directly confronting the Russian government 
on difficult bilateral issues to include: the receipt of public reports of Russian assistance 
to the Iranian missile program, urgent requests from the Israeli government to focus on 
weapons proliferation, a U.S. Congress initiative to consider legislation providing for 
sanctions against Russian companies guilty of selling missile technology to Iran, and 
widespread reports of Russian violations of its non-proliferation commitments.47 An AP 
reporter at a commission meeting effectively summed up the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission by stating that: 
The committee was deeply flawed by its own structural defects - the need 
for a facade of success regardless of the reality, an excessive dependence 
on personal relationships... and a willful blindness to conflicting 
information about Russian affairs from sources outside the commission's 
staff bureaucracy .48 
594. 
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In essence, the commission further exacerbated the impending effects of an already 
superficial U.S. policy and corrupt Russian initiatives. 
G.       SYSTEMATIC DISREGARD OF EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION 
Inherent in the United States' sole reliance on Yeltsin and his cronies was the 
necessity to proclaim unfettered support for and complete resilience to all assertions of 
corruption in conjunction with the newly created bureaucracy. Tangible concern for or 
even knowledge of the progress of reforms was overshadowed by a dependence upon 
public support and blind loyalty to the institution in place. Clinton and his staff went far 
beyond the norm of international relations as they became Yeltsin's "cheerleader, 
accomplice, and spin doctor," and thus implicated the United States in some "ill-advised 
and wicked deeds."49 
1.        The 1995 CIA Report 
In 1995, CIA officials dispatched to the White House a secret report documenting 
some of Chernomyrdin's corrupt practices. The report stated that the private assets he 
had accumulated while in his official position amounted to billions of dollars. According 
to numerous sources listed in the Cox documents, when the report reached the vice 
president, he not only refused to accept it, but also sent it back with "bull ****" scrawled 
across it.50 Gore grew increasingly effusive about Chernomyrdin's good will as evidence 
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of corruption continued to surface and intensify the Russian people's dissatisfaction with 
the overarching power of the oligarchs. "Friends have a right to be proud of friends," 
Gore proclaimed months later to a group of reporters while in Moscow meeting with the 
prime minister, "The longer one works with [Chernomyrdin], the deeper one's respect 
grows for his ability to get things done." The extent of available, supportive, open-source 
information makes such knee-jerk dismissals of top-secret allegations of corruption all 
the more remarkable.51 As David Ignatius quoted in a Washington Post article, "It was 
all laid out for Gore ... and he didn't want to hear it. Our government knew damn well 
what was happening."52 
2.        "Plausible Deniability" 
As a means of self-protection, the administration sought plausible deniability - the 
ability to deny involvement in a situation in such a way that culpability is overridden by 
seemingly overwhelming evidence. Attainability of this "innocence," however, grew 
increasingly more difficult as Russian assessments of U.S. knowledge of corruption 
further undermined the administration's claims of innocence. A 1995 report by a think 
tank associated with the Russian military, the Russian Institute of Defense Studies, stated 
in a report issued contemporaneously with the Gore "bull****" incident: 
Special services of Western countries have full access today to all 
documentation of joint ventures and other partners of Russian exporters, 
they have the originals of financial documents, they are knowledgeable 
regarding the movement of commodity resources and financial flows, they 
have information on bank account numbers of the 'new Russians,' and 
they know about their real estate and securities transactions abroad.53 
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Even as such publicly available Russian sources began to conclude that Western 
intelligence services knew about the full extent of Russian official corruption, top Clinton 
administration policy makers continued to ignore it.54 
3.        Standards of Proof 
In order to better hedge against the necessity to concede to the knowledge of such 
allegations, Gore and other top Clinton administration officials conveniently demanded a 
"smoking gun" whenever they sought to suppress unpleasant facts. By establishing 
standards of proof that were impossible to meet, they created a system designed to reject 
all "inconvenient" intelligence when it suited the purposes of the White House. 
According to one CIA official: 
These people [the Clinton-Gore administration] have expected something 
no one in the intelligence community could provide - judicial burden of 
proof. ... Did we have an authenticated videotape of the person actually 
receiving a bribe? No. But reporting from established, reliable sources 
was written off as vague and unsubstantiated.55 
Numerous serious allegations against Chernomyrdin, made by both open and 
official, U.S. and Russian sources, were simply rejected by the Clinton administration. 
According to Wayne Merry, head of the U.S. Embassy's political section in Moscow, the 
administration's desire to make the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission a success prevented 
reporting about the realities of crime and corruption.56 
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Even in 1998,. after Yeltsin terminated Chernomyrdin's tenure as prime minister 
(after which Chubais, Nemstov, and Kulikov departed); force-fed Kirienko as premier 
(which took three coercive attempts in the Duma); appointed Berezovsky (a strong- 
minded ally, "clan member," and oligarch he had fired only five months earlier) as 
executive secretary of the CIS; and approved Chubais' assumption of the post of the 
chairman of the board of the electricity monopoly (which made him a full-blown 
oligarch); the U.S. government continued to operate in "Panglossian mode."57 
H.      THE RISE OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
The United States can certainly not be blamed for creating Russian corruption. 
Even though the Russian elite started making their newest fortunes during the last years 
of the Soviet Union, this type of self-aggrandizement, though deplorable, has been a 
general phenomenon in all transitioning post-Cold War economies, and a logical 
extension of the Soviet Nomenklatura, In 1992 alone, through the sale of commodity 
exports, subsidized credits, and food imports, almost 80% of Russia's GDP was amassed 
in the hands of a few corrupt individuals. By purchasing commodities at state-controlled 
prices and selling them abroad at world rates, $24 billion (30% of Russia's GDP) was 
garnered by a few state enterprise managers, government officials, politicians, and 
commodity traders. The issuing of "gift" credits at 10-25% in the midst of 2,500 % 
inflation accumulated another 32% of Russian GDP in the hands of a few privileged 
bankers and "friends." Finally, as subsidies for food were lifted in an effort to feed the 
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masses, importers who paid only 1% of the going exchange rate when purchasing 
essential foods from abroad sold them freely on the domestic market and accrued 17.5% 
of Russian GDP.58 
Unfortunately, this corruption permeated below the head. The nation's economy 
had been badly broken for some time. By the onset of the new millennium, some 50% of 
Russians lived below the poverty line of $30-$35 a month with a probable additional 20- 
30% very near to it.59 People needing to make ends meet looked for alternatives and 
often theft, counterfeiting, tax evasion, extortion, and barter became the best available 
options.60 Russians therefore have no one but their own leaders to blame for their 
nation's innate corruption. 
Though the Clinton administration's failure to place a primary emphasis on 
replacing Communism with the basic elements of a market economy severely intensified 
Russia's problems, it cannot be held completely responsible for them. The neglect of the 
U.S. administration, intensified by the tendency to openly support and praise corrupt 
leaders and their practices, greatly exacerbated Russia's financial problems and social 
strife by helping to create conditions under which Russian corruption could continue to 
flourish. In sum, it was a combination of Western-initiated reforms and Russia's corrupt 
handling of them that:    increased crime and disorder, weakened peoples hopes for 
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democracy and a free market economy, and created and empowered an oligarchic 
economy which placed influential elite above the law and worsened the standard of living 
for ordinary Russians. 
1.      Privatization 
Yeltsin's decision, and Russia's for that matter, on whether or not to move 
towards capitalism had already been made. The defining choice that remained was what 
role state power would play in the upcoming "Big Grab" of Soviet State assets. Yeltsin 
had a choice between fostering unbridled Nomenklatura capitalism or utilizing the non- 
privileged classes and emerging civil society to create necessary market infrastructure. In 
keeping with Soviet tradition and seeking to avoid confrontation with the Nomenklatura, 
Yeltsin chose the former.61 Before continuing it is essential to note three facts. First, 
organized crime was both a cause and effect of the outcome of privatization. Second, 
privatization was carried out with direct assistance and guidance from the U.S. 
government. Third, rather than creating competitors, privatization created oligarchs.62 
To effectively critique Russia's privatization process it is essential to first discuss 
how such an initiative should have been approached and what outcomes were expected. 
Reformers should have sought to ensure that privatization: was carried out in a theft-free 
environment; did not benefit any group unduly; resulted in increased efficiency by 
bringing in new management, restructuring, or closing down inefficient divisions; 
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encouraged local and foreign investors; promoted startups; further developed a market 
infrastructure; and contributed to the strengthening of democracy.63 
Privatization failed mainly because of a tragic, mutual misunderstanding of the 
characteristics of the post-Soviet economy and the inaccurate ways in which the United 
States anticipated that the Russian people would react to reform. Russia's economic 
system at the collapse of the Soviet Union was an anomaly. A result of Stalin's 
collectivization, all remnants of a market economy had been decimated. In essence, the 
very foundation of a basic market system and all of its supporting checks and balances 
were nonexistent in Russia and needed to be built from scratch before any reforms could 
take hold. Russia's market economy didn't need to be revived as many had anticipated; it 
needed to be created. 
To have shaped this free-market economy, the public at large and the business 
community would have had to pressure the new government for both a set of equitable 
laws and its stringent enforcement from above and below.64 A competitive market 
economy composed of entrepreneurs who have an interest in self-enforcement of laws, 
codes, rules, and regulations needed to have been first on the agenda. Broad social 
consent was necessary so that it could preempt programs that aimed to impose progress 
from above.65 To achieve this, Russia would have had to enact a system of laws, codes, 
rules and regulations governing market activity and create a viable, competitive market 
infrastructure from within. Only after this had been successfully completed should large, 
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state-run institutions have been privatized. In this way, with a viable, self-enforcing 
competitive market already firmly in place, privatized companies would have been forced 
to comply in order to survive. For the sake of clarification, one touchstone fact must be 
reiterated; after 70 years of communist oppression imposed from within, very few if any 
Russians had the slightest inkling of what a market economy was comprised of, how it 
operated, or what to do to create one. 
As a result of this benchmark misunderstanding, poorly structured, inefficient, 
and insufficient Western loans, and incredibly prevalent corruption, Russia's attempts at 
privatization were near disastrous. Programs including "Loans for Shares," enabled a 
few rich bankers and oligarchs to pursue key resources at bargain prices and use them 
solely for self-aggrandizement by establishing businesses that pulled assets out of the 
system and the country itself. Furthermore, even those sparse companies that did manage 
to transition properly had difficulties operating without input/output data and imposed 
time-linked production goals. Seventy-six percent of Muscovites acknowledged that they 
did not know how to operate without an "umbrella" or a "mafia roof."66 Simply put, it 
was as difficult for Russians to instantaneously create operating codes, accounting 
practices, bankruptcy procedures, property rights, tax laws, a fair and functioning tax 
collection system, and commercial banking requirements, as it would be for Americans to 
blindly create a fully functional communist system. 
66
 Goldman, Marshall, "Reprivatizing Russia", p. 6. 
31 
I.        DEMILITARIZATION 
One of the Soviet Union's defining tasks during the Cold War, the achievement of 
military parity with the West in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons, necessitated 
the development of a powerful military-industrial complex. Consequently, nearly two- 
thirds of Russia's labor force was employed in the defense industry.67 A successful 
transition of the majority of Russia's industrial complex was therefore necessary in order 
to shift the economy from being defense-based to consumer-oriented. Yet lacking proper 
funding and expertise, to date, most reforms have been completely unsuccessful. By 
1997, although 90.0% of Russia's industrial output was produced outside the state 
structure, 47% of those companies were registering negative growth.68 Partly responsible 
for this failure is the terrible physical shape of Russia's industrial industry. The average 
age of plants and equipment is three times higher than the OECD average. In 1998, 50% 
of fixed assets were more than 15 years old and only four percent were less than five 
years old.69 
Another factor that intensifies Russia's inability to adapt from a military economy 
to a civilian one is the fact that capital has historically been a poor substitute for labor. 
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With a low ease of substitution index, Russia is increasingly constrained by outdated 
technology and an absolute inability to accrue funds for its modernization.70 
Also problematic for successful industrial transformation is the poor condition of 
infrastructure. The Soviet industrial system was based on the size and makeup of the 
Union in its entirely, not Russia proper. The breakup of the Union therefore caused 
numerous unforeseen consequences, namely the fact that Russia has no national 
infrastructure. Component industrial plants are dispersed between fourteen sovereign, 
independent states; and existing roads, railways, pipelines, power lines, water systems, 
and sewers presently remain in dire need of repair.71 Consequently, as held true during 
Soviet days, the only Russian industrial goods that are presently competitive on the world 
market are those related to military hardware, nuclear power plants, and space 
engineering.72 
J.       WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 
The failure of Russia's economic transition has created irresistible incentives for its 
military-industrial complex, individual military units, research facilities, design bureaus, 
and individual officers, soldiers, bureaucrats, and scientists to sell even the most sensitive 
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hardware and technology to virtually any interested customer.73 Further intensifying this 
problem is the fact that most interested customers are rogue states with clear anti-Western 
agendas. To many in the government who searched for ways to overcome Russia's 
economic crisis, exporting nuclear, bio-chemical and conventional contraband solves 
various economic problems. It generates hard currency; utilizes the few operable existing 
Russian industrial assets; and employs hundreds of thousands of economically misplaced 
Russians. For those who delve in corruption and organized crime, another benefit of 
such sales remains the opportunity for significant personal wealth.74 
The following are examples of ongoing Russian weapons proliferation: 
multifaceted assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program, the sale of valuable missile 
technology to Iraq in violation of the U.N. embargo; and the sale of advanced 
conventional weapons systems to any and all interested parties. In sum, Russian 
officials' continued willingness to export advanced weapons to U.S.-declared "countries 
of concern" like Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria,75 is increasingly troubling as 
for the time being it remains the most lucrative way to accrue capital in Russia. 
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K.      MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
Consequently, the "Golden Opportunity of the 20th Century" seems to have been 
missed. Economic reform initiatives, both in the United States and Russia, were 
superficial and conducted on the cheap. Russia is guilty of crime, corruption, 
manipulation, and naivete; the West is guilty of arrogance, neglect, corruption, and 
impotency. Reform attempts were characterized by: a lack of mutual understanding, 
satisfaction with preconceived misconceptions, and inappropriate support of top-down 
macroeconomic policies based on a Washington Consensus model designed for nations 
with a previously existing market economy. 
1.        Apportioning Responsibility 
Although ultimate responsibility must be shared, as is common with elder 
siblings, this author assigns the majority of the blame to the United States.  Culpability 
should be assigned as 51% for the United States and 49% for Russia. Western reforms, 
which proved to be rhetorically based and effectively hollow, overtly ignored Russia's 
incapacity and corruption. Russians have no one to blame but themselves for corruption; 
but the United States was in a position to be able to at least cut off what was known to be 
"dirty money," if not go a step further and actually attempt to make a difference in 
curtailing corruption.  In essence, U.S. leadership aided and abetted the corrupt Russian 
elite who in turn facilitated the further weakening of the state and degradation of society. 
After a decade of failed attempts at economic reform, players on both sides of the 
court are frustrated and have little or no interest to continue.   The tragedy in this is that 
both nations could have built upon the momentum, enthusiasm, and euphoria of the 
immediate post-Cold War period.   Conversely, Westerners now see Russia as a large, 
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corrupt state that they prefer to ignore, while Russians see the United States as an 
aspiring hegemon on whom they have begun to give up hope. Though blame cannot be 
directly assessed, many Russians look at the United States as bearing much of the 
responsibility for the nation's recent economic failure. Russians attest that after agreeing 
to transition with the assistance of the West, the United States merely looked on, feigning 
assistance and then quickly criticizing failed efforts. Westerners, on the other hand, 
claim that "Russia lost Russia." 
2.        Hope for the Future 
A decade has been lost and with it has disappeared the golden opportunity of the 
century; but there is still a chance for revival. Though Russia does not yet have a 
legitimate democratic system, many elements of democracy are firmly in place.76 Russia 
has held successful democratic elections, has a relatively free press, and has created the 
workings of a market economy. Fifteen years ago, no one would have guessed that U.S.- 
Russian relations would be where they are today. As the only remaining superpower at 
the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States inherited the innate moral 
responsibility to assist Russia's transformation. After a decade of failure in this arena, 
that responsibility not only still exists, but also has been exponentially heightened. 
3. Realignment 
Russia's future and consequently the future of the U.S.-Russian rapport rely on 
both nations' ability to rid themselves of Cold War stereotypes. At present, the U.S.- 
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Russian relationship is reminiscent of a duel between a bully and a sore loser. For the 
United States, re-engaging Russia means rising above Cold War arrogance and realizing 
that even in its weakened position, Russia has legitimate interests, rights, and 
responsibilities in world affairs.77 The United States must engage Russia in a 
conciliatory manner, looking at the nation as a partner and no longer a "failed state." For 
Russia, re-engaging the United States means being capable of transitioning from a Cold 
War superpower to one of many powerful European states in a newly forged multi-polar 
community. Russia needs to engage the United States as a new, cooperative, powerful 
nation vice an ostracized "fallen angel." Russia's future no longer remains in parity with 
the United States; it lies in concert with Europe. Demonstrations like that which occurred 
in Pristina78 highlight the fact that Russia is fighting to retain its prestige and find its 
place in the world. The United States needs to not only support this, but also to play a 
sincere, supportive, and unintrusive role in its coming to fruition. 
The West cannot just cut Russia off since what happens in Russia has historically 
proven to affect the entire Eurasian region. With half its population living below poverty 
conditions, Russia can be seen as more a Third-World country than a great nation, but in 
reality it cannot be treated as such. Though one cannot mistake Russia's present army for 
the Soviet military machine, the fact that Russia retains a significant nuclear capability 
cannot be overlooked. 
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L.       FINDING "RUSSIA'S WAY" 
The West presently has the opportunity and the obligation to respect Russia's 
democratic choices, even if they may be "imperfect" in comparison with Western ideals. 
Though Western reformers continue to assert that, "democracy in Russia is a 
precondition for cooperation,"79 this mindset is paradoxical since Russia cannot 
consolidate its democracy without Western assistance. Russia is unique; it possesses its 
own distinct history, culture, and future aspirations. Its people, its leadership, and its 
youth have their own ways of viewing themselves and others. The nation's economy 
must therefore reflect this singularity. George Kennan described what the West must do 
if it is not to be held accountable for the continued decline of Russia's internal and 
external state of affairs: 
Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal 
problems in their own manner. ... The ways by which peoples advance 
toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute 
the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing 
less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference 
can do less good.80 
Russia will not react like the West because it is not like the West; Russia's 
economy will not respond like those of the developing Third-World nations because its 
problems are of a different nature; the Washington Consensus is therefore an 
inappropriate prescription for economic reform. 
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There are many ideas on the table as to what is the best way to accomplish 
Russia's second attempt at a democratic transition. Some theorists advocate a system 
similar to Germany's social democracy. Others propose a Russian "mixed economy" and 
"regulated market" of gradual, state-guided reform.81 Many argue that anything short of 
occupation is doomed to failure while others attest that a program similar to the Marshall 
Plan would be successful. Personal preference aside, it is paramount that the foundation 
of Russia's plan be comprised of three of the underlying principles present in both the 
Marshall Plan and the occupation of Germany. First, they were both backed by massive 
amounts of capital and hands-on assistance; second, they were executed in the true spirit 
of rendering aid as their goal was to assist ensure proper destinies for war-torn nations; 
and third, they were both administered with long-term solutions in mind. Many propose 
that Russia has had and lost its chance for democratic consolidation. This statement in 
itself is absurd. It took 178 years for African Americans to exercise their basic right to 
vote in the United States of America, the leader of the free, democratic world. 
Democracy, and the formation of a corresponding market economy, is a process, not an 
event. It takes time and trial and error. Russia deserves this opportunity. 
What the United States and Europe need to do is make a tremendous, joint effort 
to move in a major, structured, and heavily funded manner with the assistance of large, 
powerful corporations. If such cooperation is still possible, a team of experts needs to be 
sent to Russia to discuss, debate, and formulize practical policies before financial 
assistance is rendered.    This cannot however, be done in a condescending manner. 
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Attitudes need to reflect a thorough understanding of the peculiarities of Russia and the 
particulars of its present situation, and a sincere, unbiased desire to assist. 
The Russian way has yet to be discovered.  One thing is for certain; that neither 
The Washington Consensus, nor any of the other aforementioned programs are a 
sufficient recipe for fixing Russia's disaster because they were all specifically designed 
for different countries, in different situations, with different problems.   What is necessary 
is an in-depth study of all these programs, and any others that have been attempted or 
even suggested, in an effort to extract essential, successful elements and use them as 
building blocks for Russia's system. Regardless of what the specifics of such a system 
will end up being, Russia's economy must be based upon a democratic market system, 
yet be specially tailored to fit the unique characteristics of Russia, its people, and its 
history.   The previously discussed multinational economics team needs to help Russia 
find its own third way, its own middle road. Most importantly, Russians themselves need 
to be able to create and implement this system with sincere, unfettered, long-term, 
academic and financial assistance from the West.   Such assistance however, must be 
made contingent upon the mutual understanding that if Russian corruption is not 
effectively curtailed, Western support and funding will be cut off immediately. 
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III. NATO EXPANSION 
The abrupt end of the Cold War and communism's dominance over Eastern 
Europe left in their wake an immediate influx of new states -fraught with cultural, 
economic and ethnic strife - which continue to aspire to become democratic nation-states 
and seek inclusion and protection within NATO. The United States, as the champion of 
the Cold War, offered a hand to these newly freed nations and their struggle for inclusion 
into the "West." Since NATO held a monopoly over the most effective global security 
institutions, it was the logical Western choice for the foundation on which to build the 
post-Cold War security system. Russia's ideal choice, conversely, lay with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a Euro-centric organization, absent 
NATO's antagonism toward the Soviet Union, wherein the Russian Federation could act 
as an equal in a system of great European powers. The West, however, turned to the 
North Atlantic Alliance for security, and in doing so expressly isolated Russia. 
In response to NATO's first round of expansion in 1999, the Russian public has 
since 1999, overwhelmingly embraced an anti-Western, anti-NATO attitude. Though 
this consternation was initially, politically motivated, its follow-on Russia/West schism 
has manifested itself in: a seldom-attainable Russian political-public consensus, a new 
antagonistic military doctrine and security concept, difficulties in the adherence to 
existing international agreements, increased anti-Western, targeted military deployments 
and demonstrations, the forging of new anti-western military, strategic, economic and 
technical partnerships and alliances, and a government that increasingly reorients itself to 
the right of an already conservative political spectrum. 
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Often overlooked by observers with regard to NATO expansion is the underlying 
principle of the rebuilding of the European security arena and the institutions required for 
its contemporary relevance. Although the 1999 accession of Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary has served as a short-term benefit to those three nations; their membership, 
as well as the proposed—and arguably inevitable—future expansion of NATO has 
significantly weakened the stability of pan-European security. 
This chapter seeks to illustrate how and for what reasons NATO expansion has 
resulted in the formation of a formidable anti-Western/anti-NATO Russian political- 
public coalition and consequent Russia/West rift. The analysis will begin with a general 
background of contemporary Russia-NATO relations. The next section details Russia's 
reaction to expansion and defines which components of the Russian psyche underline 
Russia's actions. The following section explains how Russia views NATO as a direct, 
military threat and leads into a discussion on Russia's fears of isolation and containment. 
Next will follow a section that outlines governmental, political, and public aspects of 
Russia's psychological and physical isolation and leads into an explanation of the myriad 
ways a revived US/NATO-Russia schism has manifested itself within the concepts of 
European Security. The next section breaks from present day effects and details why 
Russia, as a vanquished power, must be readmitted into the security system. Following 
this will be a return to a description of Russia's global reorientation and an exploration of 
the state of East-West relations. The concluding section will reiterate the effects NATO 
expansion has had on the security arena, discuss how expansion missed its reason-for 
being because of NATO's failure to reorient to the needs of a new, multi-polar security 
environment, and present a final evaluation, or scorecard detailing how well the 
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objectives of NATO expansion have been met. Further recommendations for the future, 
based on the failures of the most recent round of accession into NATO, will be detailed in 
the concluding chapter of this study. 
A.  BACKGROUND 
From 1991 onward, Russia made prominent efforts to transform itself into a 
democratic, market-driven society, a "Western moral project."82 Regardless of the 
nation's insistence upon being "adorned" with an unrealistic amount of influence and 
prestige, Russia's posture was one of hopeful cooperation with the West. Efforts 
materialized into numerous strategic initiatives and concessions made by Russia in 
coordination with the United States. Though many of these initiatives failed because of a 
lack of Western guidance, money, and leadership; and a shortage of Russian expertise, 
precedence, and corruption-control procedures; the sentiment of the day was clearly one 
of nostalgia, change, and reorientation toward cooperation as partners in lieu of 
competition as adversaries. 
Under former President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets surrendered their Eastern 
European buffer zone, permitted the unification of Germany, signed the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaties, and 
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provided for massive reductions in Europe's conventional forces and the continent's 
nuclear and strategic nuclear forces.83 
In response to this willingness to acquiesce, Russia expected at least an 
environment of transparent cooperation in which it could transition from its reign as 
Cold-War superpower to its role as one of many strong states in a newly forged multi- 
polar community. Clearly stated Russian contention over NATO expansion aside, Russia 
trusted that the West would refrain from expanding the institution into the vacuum 
created by the withdrawal of the Soviet military. Russian leadership fully believed that 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would take the place of 
NATO and become responsible for the peace and security of the region.84 As explained 
by Yeltsin in 1993, the spirit of the stipulations on German unification in 1989 was 
believed to have ruled out the possibility of further NATO expansion. Instead, Russia 
and NATO should, "...officially offer [Central European states] security 
guarantees...enshrined in a political declaration or a treaty on cooperation between the 
Russian Federation and NATO...and a truly pan-European security system (not, 
however, on the basis of blocs)...."85 
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The United States, conversely, immediately assumed the role of arbitrator in its 
own unipolar world. Western actions during 1990's were characterized by aloof 
ambivalence. A Pentagon draft study released in March 1992 described a desirable 
American policy objective as being "...a unipolar world in which the remaining 
superpower, the United States, would guarantee global order, while deterring any other 
nation or group of nations from challenging its primacy."86 The Russian preference for a 
multi-polar balance was therefore overridden by an American desire for "...exploiting 
Europe via NATO once again to achieve world hegemony...."87 Disregarding both 
Russia's outward contention toward expansion and the nation's continued attempts at 
privatization, democratization, and Western orientation, Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary were admitted into NATO. As a result of its size, history, prestige, and nuclear 
inventory, the West should have given Russia the opportunity for real consultation in 
negotiations concerning political and strategic matters as significant as expansion, 
regardless of the nation's economic and military bankruptcy. Instead, NATO, with the 
United States in the lead, in effect gave Russia the status of a vanquished nation and 
began to treat it as such. 
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Stripped of its position and inherent great-power dignity, Russia has recently 
demonstrated open resistance to Western actions. The strategic arena's new, 
debilitating Russia/West rift can be regarded as the first of many unforeseen 
consequences. Even though the stated objectives of expansion were to: make NATO 
stronger, secure democratic gains in Eastern Europe, foster regional stability, and erase 
Stalin's artificial dividing lines,88 overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the first 
of the previously mentioned goals is subjective, the second is primarily limited to new 
inductees, while that which the third and fourth objectives were intended to abolish, was 
actually intensified. 
Russia's pro-Western, pro-democratic, post-Cold War outlook has been replaced 
by one of suspicion and alienation; one that identifies the West, the United States, and 
NATO as adversaries and has started to lead Russia towards countries like China, North 
Korea, Iran, and Iraq for economic, strategic, and military alliances. It is in concert with 
these antagonistic nations that Russian initiatives could transform into legitimate threats 
and lead the security arena full circle, back into one comprised of Eastern and Western 
Blocs fervently opposed to one another in all aspects. 
Many argue that Russian actions should be regarded as mere political sentiment 
and not realpolitik, with effects that will remain negligible and mundane, useful only for 
the intellectual exercise of politicians, theorists, and academics. Though an actual, 
physical Russian threat reminiscent of Soviet days is non-existent as a result of a crippled 
88
 "In the U.S. National Interest." NATO Enlargement. Available [Online]: 
|>ttp://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/natoindex.html], p. 1, Oct. 2000. 
46 
economy; U.S.-inspired NATO actions taken since the end of the Cold War have created 
a seldom-attained political anti-NATO/anti-Western consensus in Russia which has 
trickled down to a once-Western-emulative general public and manifested itself in: the 
roll back of democratic and political reform; a government increasingly leaning toward 
nationalistic, authoritarian rule; the adoption of adversarial security and military doctrines 
which promote limited nuclear war and nuclear first-use; and ongoing attempts to create 
anti-Western alliances to counter Western hegemony. 
B.        RUSSIA'S REACTION TO EXPANSION 
Russia made its case clear at the onset of discussions about the possibility of 
NATO expansion-the acceptance of new members would be seen as a direct threat to the 
sovereignty of the nation. This, however, did not alter Western actions. The first round 
of expansion was concluded in 1999; leaving Russia with only rhetorically based empty 
promises of a new era of cooperation, peace, security, and democracy. This state of 
affairs has resulted in a common sentiment among Russians that the West has betrayed 
them.89 
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Sergei Karaganov, one of Russia's friendliest critics of expansion, was quoted as 
explaining Russia's reaction with the following analogy: 
In 1990 we were told quite clearly by the West that dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. 
We did not demand written guarantees because, in the euphoric 
atmosphere of that time, it would have seemed almost indecent, like two 
girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other's husbands.90 
Faced with a first-ever opportunity to create an international environment 
characterized by democracy and partnership, as a result of U.S.-inspired NATO 
expansion, a groundless threat of the rebirth of Soviet/Russian aggression has recently 
emerged in the post-Cold War security arena. The initiative has formidably damaged 
once-hoped-for prospects of a bright future. George Kennan, the "father" of containment 
strategy described NATO expansion in the following terms: 
The most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. 
Expansion will inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic 
tendencies in Russian opinion, adversely affect the development of 
Russian democracy, restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West 
relations, and impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to 
our liking.91 .. .There was a total lack of necessity for this move.92 
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C.        INCOMPREHENSION OF RUSSIA'S REACTION 
Mutual misperceptions have regrettably characterized relations since the end of 
the Cold War. The incomprehension of why Russia is so vehemently opposed to 
expansion is one of the gravest of these errors. First off, broadly stated, the initiative 
excludes Russia from a region that has been within its sphere of interest for centuries. 
Russia openly perceives that NATO has plans for further enlargement and unilateral "out 
of area"93 operations in both the Balkans and the Caucasus, regions that have been of 
historical significance to Russian security interests. Such entanglements could destabilize 
bordering countries and spark internal splits and civil wars likely to drag Russia into 
conflicts it neither desires, nor can afford. Secondly, and on a more extreme note, many 
Russians view expansion, especially-after the Kosovo campaign, as a direct military 
threat against the motherland.94 Lastly, and most problematic, Russians spanning all 
levels of society see expansion as a blatant, Western attempt to isolate Russia, taking 
from it its place in the international arena. Westerners cannot seem to comprehend that 
these convictions exist, let alone why. 
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1.        The Russian Mindset 
Before continuing with this analysis it is essential to take a moment to identify a 
few basic components of the Russian mentality.95 This is not meant to qualify, or brand 
"a Russian mindset," but to explain certain, recurring, psychological tendencies. Often 
used as key discussion points for Russian foreign policy elite, these psychological biases 
have permeated the civilian sector and now seem to be subconsciously ingrained in the 
ordinary Russian citizen's mind. First of all, Russia undoubtedly views NATO as a 
militaristic organization; and since it was initiated to counter the Soviet Union; asserts 
that it still exists in direct opposition to Russia.96 As stated by Alexei K. Pushkov, 
Director for Political and Public Affairs of the Public Russian Television, "Western 
countries, including the United States and Germany, were no longer regarded as Russia's 
enemies, NATO was still viewed as a potentially anti-Russian coalition. It was also seen 
as a collective enemy."97 Second, expansion is perceived as being the beginning of the 
creation of a buffer zone of anti-Russian populations, which isolate Russia from 
continental Europe. Third, another commonly held contention is that the West promised 
that after the inclusion of East Germany, NATO would not continue to expand. Resulting 
expansion, therefore, caused Russians to feel defensive and paranoid, as if they had been 
"stabbed in the back"98 by the West.    Fourth, is a fear of externally imposed strategic 
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confinement that has been deeply rooted in Soviet/Russian history, has with time become 
an almost primal instinct for Russians. Lastly, and arguably most significant, Russia 
presently struggles with an "inferiority complex"99 because of its financial bankruptcy, 
consequent economic dependence on the West, military inferiority, lack of respect and 
status, mute voice in world affairs, and loss of allies which, in the last decade have 
become anti-Russian. 
These beliefs - intensified by 70 years of ideological isolation - are consequently 
ingrained in several generations of Russians and cannot be replaced in a mere decade or 
two. Whether seemingly irrational, unfounded, and arbitrary from a cursory Western 
point of view, these complexes have proven to play a significant political role as they can 
have implications for internal and external Russian affairs. Having already played a part 
in "pushing Russia towards an arms race, a nationalistic and anti-Western stand, and 
preventing democratic reforms,"100 these fears must be taken into consideration when 
dealing with issues sensitive to Russians. Although many critics claim that Russia's 
sensitivity represents a clear exaggeration of the dangers inherent in expansion, it is on 
par with the predominant Russian disposition. Case in point, not a single official Russian 
document, to date, avoids the affirmation that Russia is a great power.   The nation's 
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reaction to  expansion can therefore be partially characterized as an aversion to 
inferiority.101 
Enveloped by memories of more than four decades of Soviet control and 
aggression, it is almost impossible for the international community to remember that 
Russia has also suffered more than two centuries of invasion through the pathway of 
Eastern Europe. As significant as the desperate plight of countries like Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, is the destruction brought to Russia through the nation's 
eastern corridor. Napoleon's Grand Army invaded Russia in 1812, Kaiser Wilhelm IPs 
soldiers took to the heartland in World War I, and Hitler's Blitzkrieg ransacked the nation 
in World War II. In the latter conflict the Russian population was literally crippled, with 
more than 20 million killed by a nation with which Russia had signed a non-aggression 
pact.102 Just as East-West/West-East hatred had been bred with longevity during the 
Cold War, Russia's intuitive defensive orientation has been paid for with the motherland 
soaked with Red Army blood shed for the Allies during World War II. To Russians, this 
devastation and suffering overshadows misfortunes that the Soviet Union brought to 
Europe as a result of its Western expansion both before and after the Second World 
War.1«« 
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D.       NATO POLICY AS A DIRECT THREAT 
A product of this psychological imprisonment, presently, some Russians actually 
feel that NATO expansion has become a direct military threat to the nation. Used 
intensely by Moscow in the mid and late 1990's, this paranoia has intensified and begun 
to take hold in the general public after only ten years of Russia's "new existence." 
According to Russian Chief of General Staff Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, a fear of 
encirclement exists because as a byproduct of the first round of expansion; NATO 
missiles, if stationed 650-750 km closer to Russia would render the nation's defenses 
ineffective, thereby reducing Russia's early warning time of an offensive.104 In effect, to 
Russians, expansion has rendered Russia's nuclear and conventional weapons insufficient 
as deterrents.105 As Gen. Kvashnin explains, Russian leadership now views Eastern 
European security as a zero-sum game played at the nation's expense. "The approaching 
of NATO's infrastructure to Russian.borders is a direct increase of NATO's combat 
possibilities, which is unfavorable for our country in a strategic sense. We will regard the 
approaching of NATO's tactical aviation to Russian borders as an attempted nuclear 
threat."106 
As demonstrated by the Cold War arms race, Russia is extraordinarily 
uncomfortable with being poised against a number of states and alliances that possess 
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superior armed forces. Over the next ten years, as a result of NATO expansion and the 
present conventional superiority in Europe of 2.5:1, NATO will possess substantial 
nuclear superiority over Russia with both tactical and strategic forces. This is a stark 
contrast from just ten years ago when in addition to parity with strategic forces; the 
Warsaw Pact enjoyed 3:1 conventional force superiority over NATO and a 2:1 theater 
and tactical nuclear weapons advantage.107 
The magnitude of this juxtaposition of the balance of power in Europe is 
extremely provocative toward Russia, especially with regard to the nation's failing 
struggle to retain a respectable level of international prestige. The Russian Federation 
inherited everything from the USSR but its "territorial integrity, secure borders, and a 
sense of being an impregnable power."108 Recent high-level actions taken on political 
and strategic levels are prime examples of attempts to counterbalance this tendency. 
Rhetoric aside, to date, NATO's post-Cold War attempts to stabilize the security arena 
through the expansion of the Alliance have not only concentrated solely on specific areas 
in Eastern Europe, but have also had destabilizing effects on "other" areas and 
consequently on the system as a whole. The result is the beginning of the recreation of a 
Cold War-era109 adversarial rapport between Russia and the West. 
107
 Arbatov, Alexei, "The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons 
Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya." The Marshall Center Papers, translated from 
Nezavisimoye Obozreniye, 14 Jan 2000, p. 5. 
108
 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 7. 
109
 When Cold War is used in this manner throughout the study, it not used to 
signify all aspects of the actual Cold War, especially not economic and military aspects. 
Conversely, it refers to an antagonistic Russia/West rapport reminiscent of the Cold War- 
era. 
54 
E.        CONTAINMENT REVISITED 
The initiation of the three newest member states, often promised to be the first in 
a future filled with expansion, is seen by many Russians as a Western attempt to encircle 
the Cold War-weakened nation and return to NATO its main responsibility of 
containment. As a result of Russia's present-day inability to take unimpeded action, 
there exists a basic national assumption that NATO poses a threat to Russia. Many 
Russians therefore conclude that NATO expansion was not an effort to promote 
democratic principles and foster security in the new international arena, rather an attempt 
to deter Russia110 by moving to bring former Soviet satellite states under its wing before 
Russia was capable of attempting the same. Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, Director of the 
Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense briefly identifies the basis 
behind the threat posed by NATO's new proximity: 
...strategically important targets, including the command posts and 
weapons of strategic nuclear forces, are within striking range [of NATO 
tactical aircraft]. Modern aircraft in the NATO arsenal can strike deep 
into Russia. Currently they have sufficient range to strike against fifty to 
sixty percent of facilities of Russia's nuclear arsenal, and practically all 
command posts of the government and high command.1 J ] 
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This trepidation and the following "worst-case scenario" are examples of how 
Russian leaders commonly disseminate (to the public sector) political and military fears 
and speak to institutional imperatives of a rebirth of nuclear vulnerability. 
Some assess that expansion has rendered NATO's eastern frontiers have been 
rendered indefensible. With this in mind it can be argued that Slovakia and Slovenia 
must be included to protect the southern borders of Poland and Hungary. Additionally, 
since the Kaliningrad enclave cannot be liquidated, it must be isolated with the inclusion 
of Lithuania. Furthermore, if Poland's northern flank is to be fully protected, the rest of 
the Baltic States must be included in an effort to shorten NATO lines and anchor the left 
flank of the Gulf of Finland. Additionally, in the south, Romania must be included to 
anchor NATO's southern frontiers and defend the Hungarian plain. Finally, the inclusion 
of the Ukraine could create a formidable pincer on Belarus and the Baltics.112 
Though an extreme and seemingly absurd scenario, the rationale that lies behind it 
is in keeping with not only Russia's fears of marginalization and encirclement, but also 
the Western fear of a revival of Russian power. Though not the official reason for the 
expansion of NATO, many Eastern European nations still believe in the epic myth that 
Russia aspires to restore its hegemony in the region. Regardless of the fact that the 
nation's present status proves its inability to successfully act with aggression,113 a clear 
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case can be made that this paranoia is a benchmark motivation for Eastern European 
nations' quest for NATO inclusion. 
The possibility of such containment foreshadows the very same envelopment 
Russia has begun to fear, and against which the nation stands. According to Russian 
strategists, the nation's borders were rendered more vulnerable with NATO expansion 
than they had been since the late 1700's, making NATO's attitude a central issue for 
Moscow.114 Similar to the effect of the mere mention of Stalin's annexation of Eastern 
Europe and creation of an empire, even the remotest possibility of such containment 
coming to fruition with Russia exudes conflict and chaos. Many share the view that one 
of Stalin's main motivations for action was the fear of repeated invasion from the east. 
This rationale, if taken to the extreme, could prove extremely dangerous. Though not all 
Russians are wary of NATO literally attacking from the west, many believe Russia must 
consider being invaded an option as a result of its weakened state.115 The irony of the 
situation is that as a result of U.S.-initiated NATO expansion, Russia's attempt to defend 
against the same phantom from which Eastern European nations sought NATO 
protection, has played a role in dragging the security arena back full circle to political and 
military containment. Regardless of one's proclivity toward this type of conclusion, an 
understanding of these types of psychological barricades can often help explain why 
Russians react the way they do. 
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F.        RUSSIA'S PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL ISOLATION 
For Russia, disastrous, Western-structured economic reforms and expansion in the 
face of Russian contempt exacerbated the nation's already anti-Western sentiment, which 
had remained dormant since the end of the Cold War. It has, therefore been convenient 
for Russians to oversimplify and blame their present political, economic, and military 
stagnation on Western initiatives. A result of this recently assigned culpability; as of 
1993 there was a virtual consensus in Russia that NATO expansion would create 
conditions for the nation's isolation.116 Although some critics argue that consternation 
over expansion exists only with politicians and government officials, the number of 
Russians concerned about it continues to significantly increase with time. According to a 
recent census, in 1994 only 18% of Russians had any interest in NATO. By 1997 that 
number had skyrocketed to 80 %.117 In effect, Russians are beginning to see the West as 
looking to profit from their national weakness while strengthening itself and Russia's 
surrounding nations. 
1.        Effects on the Russian Government 
Poor social, economic, and military conditions, in addition to the nonentity many 
Russians feel their nation is becoming, as a result of both post-Cold War Western 
initiatives and Russia's inability to keep its affairs in order, have begun to have an effect 
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on the Russian government. Two laws recently passed by the Duma highlight a transition 
toward a more centralized, authoritarian system of government. The first renders the 
upper chamber of the Russian Federal Assembly (Parliament) increasingly more 
subordinate to the President; the second makes it even easier for the President to dissolve 
the Duma.118 International concern has also been levied about the recent takeover of 
Russia's largest independent television network, NTV, by allies of the Kremlin. The 
buyers immediately announced a move toward completely new membership and staffing, 
thereby justifying the criticism that NTV and its affiliates were becoming mouthpieces 
for the government.U9 This growing moral and political estrangement from the West can 
be likened to a reversion to antagonistic Cold War attitudes which refute democratic 
principles and have been preventing Russia from breaking free from the "Soviet status 
quo" and in essence, have begun to force the nation back towards it. Though NATO 
expansion cannot be given full culpability in this, it has certainly been an enabling factor 
for it has "...contributed to such a political climate in Russia that hampers and even 
threatens democratization."120 
2.        Effects on Russian Society 
The Alliance's expansion has also begun to impair Russian society. The nation's 
history attests that it was Russians who inspired the leaders of the Soviet Union to come 
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to the conclusion that it would be better to attempt to live more like the West121 Asserting 
the fact that the highest members of the Soviet Union had voluntarily dismembered their 
empire, Russia feels it has not been treated as it deserves to be. Intensifying the 
resentment behind this "lack of proper attribution," the details of the Soviet Union's 
transition, once in its final phases, were realistically made in conjunction with the West. 
For Russians, this dual involvement necessitated continued, dual responsibility. Russians 
therefore feel as if they should be treated on par with the United States regardless of their 
present internal affairs. Yet instead of being dealt with as an equal, or even like a 
sovereign nation, Russians resent the fact that the West, especially the United States, has 
treated them like a second-class citizens. Though economically, socially, and politically 
vulnerable at present, Russia remains a powerful nuclear force and plans to return to the 
world scene as a powerful nuclear entity. Public and political assertions "promise" that 
Russia will remember all that has happened when it is strong again. The problem with 
recent NATO actions is that they appear to Russia as Western attempts to challenge its 
reentry. Further proof of dissention in the Russian public over NATO's post-Cold War 
demeanor can be extrapolated from the 1996 presidential elections during which 30 
million Russians cast their vote for Gennadii Zyuganov and his anti-NATO expansion 
platform.122 
In addition to those who immediately rallied with the politicians against NATO 
expansion and those who crossed over with time, are the ordinary Russian citizens to 
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whom expansion has also become of central concern since it now appears to be the cause 
of the social and economic disarray eroding their nation.123 The spillover effects of this 
situation, as described by Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense 
Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation are: 
The U.S. public and Russian public do not see themselves as allies. They 
look at each other with suspicion, mistrust, and hostility. ... Before, 
Russia had no enemies. Now it is clearly stated that one of the primary 
threats to Russian security is the policy of the United States...124 
This escalation of tensions is a far cry from any previously sought-after spirit of 
cooperation. Intensified by the fact that Russia was legitimately attempting to reform and 
re-orient, but was politically isolated and outwardly provoked, this anti-Western 
reorientation has formed coalitions seldom previously procurable in the Soviet 
Union/Russia. 
3.        Effects on Russian Politics 
Russia's political establishment experienced a general shift in December 1994 
when a new anti-expansion coalition was born in which the Yeltsin administration, the 
military and state bureaucracy, and democratic opposition [with few exceptions] were 
regrouped. A communist-nationalist political alliance was also created.125 Though 
mundane to those not directly affected, the existence of such voluntary Russian unity 
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represents a significant shift in political opinion. This type of coalition, furthermore, 
does not end at the political level, but has also taken hold among the general public. As 
summarized by Gorbachev in 1997, "Both 'sides' (NATO and Russia) acknowledged that 
NATO expansion was the one issue on which Russians were unified."126 
The West has conspicuously continued to disregard these inclinations, which 
remain momentous points of contention for Russians who feel that they have been 
continually forced to face categorical humiliation. In contradiction with the forward- 
looking, liberated, "post-lustration" Eastern European atmosphere, it seems to Russians 
that they have been condemned to live in a state of invariable reparation for seven 
decades of Soviet atrocities and aggressions. 
G.       RUSSIA/WEST SCHISM 
The deeper tragedy of this degradation of relations between the East and West is 
that overriding political and public opinion hold that a mutually beneficial rapport is 
unlikely to be restored in the near future.127 The overwhelming present-day inclination is 
that, "Russia has the right to take whatever countermeasures it deems necessary to protect 
its own security."128   In April 2001 a Duma member even threatened to respond to 
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NATO's new foreboding demeanor with the deployment of nuclear weapons to the 
Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.129 Examples of the corresponding social, political, 
economic, and military aftershock of this reorientation can be found in the recent silence 
of optimistic pro-Western voices and exploitation of Soviet-style security mentalities and 
measures. 
1.        Russia's New Military Doctrine and Security Concept 
This antagonistic reorientation has materialized in both Russia's new security 
concept and military doctrine. Standing in stark contrast to that of their predecessors' 
optimistic prognosis of "no direct threat," these new documents examine 12 new external 
and six new internal threats.130 Russian leaders now see NATO expansion as a deliberate 
threat to all aspects of its existence. The authors of these doctrines stated the following in 
response to NATO's post-Cold War initiatives: 
The main objective of NATO enlargement is to weaken Russia's influence 
in Europe and around the world. ... Russia will soon find herself 
surrounded by NATO countries, which will enable the West to apply 
effective economic, political, and possibly even military pressure on 
Moscow.131 
These new documents name the U.S., NATO, and the West as direct security 
threats and emphasize the following elements as primary foundations of Russian security: 
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nuclear defense and deterrence, a strong conventional force to be used to defend the 
motherland from threats posed by NATO, the routine use of force to deal with local and 
domestic conflicts, and nuclear first-use tactics.132 
In direct response to cavalier Western attitudes and the new threat of a 
continuously encroaching NATO - armed and in close proximity to Russia's borders - 
Russia has lowered its threshold for the authorization of the use of tactical and strategic 
nuclear weapons. The strategy of limited nuclear war and the option of a Russian nuclear 
first-use have thereby been proclaimed as acceptable strategies in order to compensate for 
the nation's new conventional inferiority.133 
What is most alarming is not the existence of this language since the mention of 
limited nuclear war and nuclear first-use have been subtly present in previous doctrines 
since 1993, but the fact that recent military exercises have been conducted throughout all 
of European Russia to reinforce the document and Russia's underlying anxiety. Since the 
Kosovo campaign, active planning and extensive training exercises have been conducted 
to ensure the readiness of the Russian military to successfully execute limited nuclear war 
and nuclear first-use. Being that only two years have elapsed since the adoption of the 
previous, "vaguely antagonistic and nonaligned" military doctrine, it is evident that 
expansion has helped to reverse the positive course of relations that began between 
Russia and the West at the close of the Cold War. 
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2.        International Agreements 
Further manifestations of this ominous reversion have already been demonstrated 
through a decreased level of cooperation between Russia and the United States on arms 
control issues, in terms of both violating existing agreements and refusing to ratify 
unconcluded treaties.134 Most notably, present Russia/West relations have placed the 
implementation of START II in doubt and retarded progress on cutting tactical nuclear 
weapons beyond the Gorbachev/Bush initiatives. Although Russian proposals on 
National Missile Defense (NMD) continue to be forthcoming, a fundamental 
disagreement on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty presently impedes 
international agreement on NMD implementation. 
With relations in question and Russia feeling as though the West has ignored its 
strategic concerns, the expectation of a reduction of the nation's most powerful strategic 
weapons is unrealistic, especially since the Russian military has repeatedly stated that it 
cannot maintain its nuclear arsenal at more than 1,5000 warheads. Dvorkin sums up this 
phenomenon in the following terms: 
NATO's expansion towards Russia's borders enables conventional 
weapons to carry out strategic missions against Russia's territory; this 
might end up finally overthrowing all the system of military agreements 
between the Russian Federation and NATO (USA) and to make 
meaningless the already achieved agreements on strategic nuclear arms 
reductions.135 
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On a more rhetorical level, the reemergence of such strategic maneuvering is one 
of many recently revived defining Cold War-era principles that demonstrates both this 
concrete degradation of Russia/West relations and a "by the numbers" reversion toward 
the past. Reminiscent of the days of mutual intimidation, instead of negotiating despite 
disagreements and competing priorities, Russia has returned to a "war of words" with the 
West. The United States seems to have returned the gesture in kind. 
3.        Military 
This Russia/West fissure has not only occurred on political, public, and economic 
levels, but has also, and possibly more ominously occurred on military ones. After 
Russia's refusal to submit Kosovo peacekeeping forces to NATO command, a convoy of 
200 Bosnian-based Russian troops by-passed British and French NATO forces waiting on 
Kosovo's Southern border to enter as part of a U.N.-sanctioned international 
peacekeeping force.136 After their unauthorized arrival at the Pristina Airport, the 
Russians blocked British reinforcements as Clinton and Yeltsin attempted to rectify the 
unapproved unilateral action.137 Certain that they rated the deployment of their 
peacekeeping troops in an exclusive section of Kosovo, Russia refused to budge until 
concessions were made. In stark contrast with the successful integration of 1,200 Russian 
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soldiers into a multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia,138 this tense and embarrassing 
standoff at the Pristina airport is yet another way through which Russia has recently 
shown the West that it does not appreciate its first-ever lack of status. 
Exercise Zapad 99,139 a military training exercise involving Kaliningrad, 
Leningrad, Moscow, Volga, the North Caucuses, the Urals military districts, and the 
Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, war gamed a nuclear campaign against NATO 
forces, thereby clarifying the probable options that lie behind Russia's new military and 
security doctrines. Additionally, to demonstrate the strength of its nuclear capability to an 
eastward-expanded NATO, Russia recently launched two intercontinental missiles (one 
from a base in northwest Russia and one from a submarine in the Barents Sea).140 In 
light of these facts, it seems that Russia has been recently trying to evince that to a proud 
and geographically immense nation accustomed to being one of only two superpowers, 
Western-imposed     marginalization     is     a     direct     and     dangerous     affront. 
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H.       NECESSITY TO READMIT THE VANQUISHED POWER 
Briefly following the Soviet Union's demise, NATO took a cautious stance 
against expansion. On May 6, 1991, NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner stated 
that Central European democracies, 
".. .neither want to be neutral nor components of a buffer zone, and nor do 
we. ... NATO did not want a shift of balance or an extension of its 
military borders to the East; ... our security spills over and contributes to 
deterring the idea that use of force, directly or indirectly, might lead to 
results.141 
Skepticism about expansion was actually quite significant; it spanned East and 
West, existed in both the political and the public realm, was shared by Republicans and 
Democrats alike, and was even stated to have caught State Department and Pentagon 
officials off guard during a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting in 1997. Though 
it is not feasible to cite all comments here, the following two examples should provide a 
good idea as to what main concerns were expressed at the time. Sen. John Warner (R), 
former U.S. Secretary of the Navy, compared the possibility of future NATO engagement 
in Central and Eastern Europe to the Somalia situation and wondered whether instability 
would be bred in the region by inviting only some and not all nations. Sen. Ted Kennedy 
(D) argued that "ten times as much effort has been spent on NATO enlargement 
141
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compared to what seems to be a much more deadly, clear and present danger" (the safety 
of nuclear weapons and material in Russia).142 
This bipartisan concern, in concert with Russian objections, should have lead to 
an in-depth, NATO-led study that could have answered these types of pertinent questions. 
Instead, the West pushed for the initiation of the expansion process irrespective of its 
probable consequences. Henceforth, to many Russians, NATO expansion against its 
wishes and without its input confirmed the West's intent to create a post-Cold War 
security system void of Russia. 
History strongly validates the fact that a defeated power must be readmitted into 
the security system as a regular member to participate in the balancing process, regardless 
of what type system is being created.143 France's re-admittance after the Napoleonic Era 
and Germany's after World War II demonstrate how a more dignified option like 
inclusion assists in recreating an effective security system with the defeated power kept 
in check. Conversely, Germany's isolation from the world scene following World War I 
illustrates how grievous estrangement can be. Disregarding this historical precedence, 
the West has presently failed to carve a niche for Russia in the post-Cold War security 
system because of a familiar inability to part with the past. Admiral William Smith, U.S. 
Military Representative to NATO alleged in 1993 that neighboring Russia must be 
successfully readmitted for any security arrangement to be effective. "We must be 
careful to prevent a new division from taking hold...that separates Western and Central 
142
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Europe from the former Soviet Union.   On this argument, what happens to Poland and 
Hungary, for example, is important to us; but what happens in Russia is crucial."144 
It appears, unfortunately, that the logic applied for the admittance of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary, should have first been used to integrate Russia. "Just as 
Washington proved the key to ensuring that security for all of Europe would best be 
served by a Germany within the integrative NATO community rather than adrift in an 
undefined gray zone, so too did U.S. leadership prove decisive in applying the same 
integrative logic to other nations."145 Unfortunately, these "other nations" did not 
include Russia. Although the Alliance fully integrated the Federal Republic of Germany 
into the post-World War II security arena in 1955 and integrated Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary into the post-Cold War security arena in 1999, to date, the West 
has made only symbolic attempts to partially integrate Russia into today's security 
system, let alone include it in its entirety. It is through NATO expansion that the West 
has effectively placed Russia adrift in this "undefined gray zone." This result can in no 
way be deemed predetermined because emotions toward Germany following World War 
II were significantly more hostile than the present anti-Russian bias. Additionally, 
psychologically fragile and formidably nuclear, a flailing Russia is arguably much more 
dangerous than an unaffiliated Poland, Czech Republic, or Hungary. 
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I. RUSSIA'S GLOBAL RE-ORIENTATION 
Putin's response to recent NATO initiatives can be described as a combination of 
obstinacy and necessity. In other words, Russia's urge for vindication through the 
forging of new, anti-Western strategic ties has been abetted by the nation's serious 
downward economic spiral.146 Recently, where the West has neglected to take Russia 
seriously, Russia has begun to look for other partners.147 Instead of promoting better 
relations between Eastern European nations,148 NATO expansion has played a major part 
in encouraging, and almost driving Russia toward non-Western, non-democratic nations 
for strategic, economic, and military partnerships. Furthermore, if the smaller members 
of the CIS continue to struggle with the consolidation of their democracies, they too may 
have no choice but to join these new Russian-led, anti-Western coalitions. The 
community's most noteworthy security institution has, in effect, created a post-Cold War 
environment that has encouraged and intensified Russia's historic tendency to deviate 
from the Western norm. 
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Putin's recent trips to China, North Korea, Iran, and India, like earlier meetings 
with the Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Libya, highlight a continuation and expansion of 
former Prime Minister Primakov's efforts to create a multi-polar international system as a 
counter-weight to U.S. primacy.149 Since most pro-Western, pro-democratic societies are 
either in NATO or aspiring to be so, this multi-polarity clearly favors provocative anti- 
democratic nations like Iran, to whom Russia is a major supplier of nuclear technology 
and materials, and antagonistic leaders like Saddam Hussein, to whom Moscow acts as an 
international partner. Though not completely new, this conduct, exacerbated by post-Cold 
War NATO policies, has evolved from being a single facet of Russian strategic policy to 
being its most defining aspect. In terms of intended political messages, Putin has recently 
made it very clear that Russia will not return to its past, Kozyrev150-initiated, one-sided, 
Western-oriented policy.151 Expansion seems to be what necessitated the policy's 
abandonment. 
1. The Sino/Russian Rapport 
To illustrate this point, significant steps that have already been taken to expand 
and solidify a new 21st century Russian/Chinese rapport aimed at countering U.S. 
domination will be discussed. In the military arena, Sino/Russian agreements with regard 
to the Chinese purchase and licensing of SU-27 fighters and the purchase of submarines, 
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surface ships, missile systems, and surveillance systems have been initiated and in many 
cases concluded. Negotiations have also been conducted on: oil and natural gas delivery 
deals; the Russian construction of power plants in China; the delivery to China of an 
unknown number of Russian airborne early-warning radar systems (A-50E); the joint 
development of a satellite navigation system to rival U.S. GPS; the development of the 
Super-7 attack lighter; the fielding of an integrated land, sea, and air defense system; and 
the potential construction of a 1.8 billion-dollar pipeline from Siberia to China.152 
Although the original basis for this relationship has been charged by critics as being a 
business proposal, the new Sino/Russian rapport is largely about Russian survival and is 
presently being used as political leverage with the West. 
A simple awareness of these facts makes it evident that China is presently seen as 
one of Russia's vital strategic partners. Beneficial for China's defense aspirations and 
Russia's economy, this military, political, and economic entente, in addition to a recent 
joint resolution signed by Putin and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin, help to 
maintain and protect a new anti-Western, "...global strategic balance and stability."153 
This new strategic partnership, for which NATO expansion bears partial responsibility; 
crosses political, economic, and military borders. Originally charged as having been a 
mere "mental exercise," Russia's new orientation stands in direct contradiction with the 
security environment's present principle of democratic development, promises to act as 
152
 "Russia's Kasyanov Eyes Major Arms Deal with China."   Russia Today. 
Available [Online]: 




an extensive disruption to the full gambit of upcoming U.S. policies and initiatives, and 
could feasibly act as the catalyst for the construction of a sizeable anti-Western bloc 
situating NATO as the adversary. 
J.        STAGNATED AT PARTIAL APPEASEMENT 
It was during Nixon's presidency that the state of U.S./Soviet relations first 
moved from detente to rapprochement to partial appeasement.154 After the Soviet- 
induced chill of Prague in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and Warsaw in 1980 came a new 
warming of relations with Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika during which time the 
U.S./Soviet rapport was reinvigorated to a state of partial appeasement.155 Unfortunately, 
however, relations have remained stagnated throughout the first post-Cold War decade. 
If partial appeasement was attainable in the 60's with the roles of ideology, public 
opinion, and domestic constraints hampering efforts;156 then the fall of the Soviet Union, 
end of the Cold War, and unification of Germany should have been more than sufficient 
impetus to enable American leaders to move beyond a mere relaxation of tensions to a 
true alliance between Russia and the West.   It seems, however, that the West stopped 
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short of aspiring to do so. In an effort to stabilize former satellite states, instead of 
attempting to remove the principal causes of conflict, NATO has reinvigorated old points 
of contention without heeding the destabilizing effects that Russia's previously promised 
reactions would have on the arena as a whole. 
1.        Russia's Desire for a European Security System 
It is also essential to note here that the Soviet Union/Russia's desire for a 
European security system is not new. The Soviet Union repeatedly made requests for a 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe during the Cold War and those requests 
gained legitimacy as time went on. Russians today have also ardently attempted to 
influence the creation of this same type of security arrangement through their post-Cold 
War requests to utilize the OSCE or the UN - organizations that could conceivably 
include Russia - as the basis of today's security system. 
Even while contesting NATO expansion, Russia sought to minimize damage in 
1996 by asking for recognition of its desired "equal partner" status.157 Again, the West, 
with the United States in the lead has shut down all such attempts. Yet as the leader of 
the democratic free world, the United States cannot continue to let skepticism thwart 
legitimate attempts at making a universal change for the better even if there is not yet a 
clear definition of exactly what this change should entail. In sum, if the real objective of 
the first round of NATO expansion was truly to create a more peaceful and secure 
international arena in its entirety, then a case can be made that the initiative has failed. 
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2.        Ad Hoc U.S. Policy 
Instead of making a concerted effort to build an alliance, it appears that Western 
leaders have been afflicted by a moralist mentality, one often more concerned with 
symbolic aspects of foreign policy than actual substance, and frequently less concerned 
with influencing policy than with registering virtuous attitudes.158 Additionally, instead 
of carefully basing a strategy on the complexity and dangers involved, and discretely 
controlling and timing diplomatic moves to solidify support and neutralize opposition,159 
the West pursued an an-hoc policy, rushing into expansion and paying little heed to 
garnishing support or combating opposition. The Nixon and Gorbachev administrations 
found ways to adapt to accelerated change, thereby preserving and ameliorating the 
efficacy of their respective security environments. Conversely, the post-Cold War-West 
not only failed to properly adapt, but has also endangered its ability to maintain Russia, 
and consequently itself and NATO. 
3.        Dialogue des Sourdesl60 
In all actuality, NATO expansion has recreated a defining vicious cycle of action 
and reaction to significant conflicts of interest that is driven by mutual distrust and 
misperception.161  The situation can be characterized as being similar to a dialogue des • 
sourdes,162 with Russia misinterpreting Western actions and the West turning a deaf ear 
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to Russia's concerns. As it has held true numerous times in recent history, if there is to 
be any chance of easing present tensions, the West must begin to consult with Russia. 
Richard Nixon163 effectively described a historical example of this recurring condition 
during hearings before the U.S. Senate in 1966 when he stated, "Actions have been taken 
by the United States which vitally affected the security of our European partners, without 
even the courtesy of prior consultation.... It's time we began paying Europe more 
attention. And if our ideals of Atlantic interdependence are to mean anything in practice, 
it's time we began lecturing our European partners less and listening to them more."164 
Just as this recommendation held true for Europe in the 1960's, it holds true for Russia 
today. 
A prime example of this abeyance can already be seen in the short history of the 
1997 NATO/Russia Founding Act165 that signaled an upswing as Russia appeared to 
have been attempting to put the first round of expansion behind. Soon after the 
document's signing, Yeltsin announced a nuclear de-targeting policy; signed a strategic 
agreement with Ukraine; signed a peace accord and oil pipeline pact with Chechnya; and 
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began a new dialogue with Japan.166   Though the nation's security policy at the time 
remained ambiguous, its orientation was notably pro-democratic and pro-Western. 
Follow-on NATO actions, however, have let Russia know that even though it now 
has the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) through which it is supposed to have its voice 
heard, it is still ignored.167 A commonly cited suggestion from the Russian side as to 
how to avert conflict was described by Primakov in 1996 when he stated that a 
NATO/Russia treaty could not be reduced to a mere declaration but should contain true 
guarantees to allay Russian security concerns.168 Even though Russian sentiments about 
the nature and legitimacy of the Act were at first mixed, time has proven that it resembles 
more of a mere declaration than a substantive policy. It seems, therefore, that expansion 
has not only retarded the growth of the security system short of a Russia/West alliance, 
but it and subsequent NATO actions have also begun to unravel the few improvements 
that have been made. 
K.       THE ULTIMATE TEST OF RUSSIAN/WEST RELATIONS 
Many experts - Easterners and Westerners alike - would agree that, "The prospect 
of previous and future NATO expansion has become the most significant and potentially 
volatile issue of Russia's present-day foreign policy," and that, "It should also be 
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regarded as the ultimate test of Russia's relationship with the West."169 The inherent 
danger in this, however, is not of the literal creation of another Cold War as Russia is in 
no state to reengage in this manner because of its: economic weakness, dependence on 
Western financial sources and investments, necessary integration into the world 
economy, desire to be an integral part of international decision making, and military 
insolvency.170 The initiative can, however, continue to create an antagonistic strategic 
atmosphere with far-reaching, long-term consequences for the West's relationship with 
Russia. 
Pushkov predicted in 1995 that expansion would have the following seven 
ominous effects on the security system. First is the intensification of the schism between 
Russian civilization and that of the West. Reflecting an exclusive consolidation of 
Western civilization, he asserted that expansion would necessitate that Russia, left 
outside the alliance, would have to assert itself as a force starkly different from the West. 
Second, the initiative would cause Russia to reorient inward. Third, he stated that since 
Russia is sure to consider itself cut off from Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, it 
will have little choice but to strengthen its historical sphere of influence in its near 
abroad.171 Fourth and fifth, regardless of regional benefits, expansion would harm 
European security as a whole and jeopardize previously agreed to post-Cold War security 
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arrangements. Sixth and seventh, he concluded that expansion would influence Russia's 
internal balance offerees in favor of anti-Western factions; and promote military officials 
who favor a strong military to high positions within the government and military.172 To 
date, all seven "predictions" have at least begun to materialize if they have not already 
been crystallized. Unfortunately, it seems that their destabilizing effects have not yet 
come to full fruition. 
At a minimum, a new "dividing line of mistrust"173 has already been drafted. 
Instead of allying NATO, Eastern Europe, and Russia into a new alliance aimed at 
deterring post-Cold War regional threats and promoting the principles of democracy and 
capitalism across historical borders, expansion has begun to once again poise Russia 
against the West. Regardless of intentions, NATO has isolated Russia and left it with no 
choice other than to reorient and counteract the continued isolation that lies ahead. 
1.        How Expansion "Missed the Point" 
Overwhelming evidence exists supporting the claim that NATO expansion has 
missed the point. Many critics state that arguments for enlargement were often 
mechanical and somehow missing the meaning of the Alliance.174 Other than the 
promotion of democratic principles and a market economy in Eastern Europe, stated 
objectives do not coincide with real outcomes. Western shortsightedness and the 
stereotypical identification of Russia as the enemy, in concert with Russia's defensive 
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and paranoid outlook and influx of corruption have assisted in the Western 
misidentification of how the post-Cold War security arena should have been constructed. 
Presently, the state of Russia/West relations is undeniably worse than it was in 
1991, or 1989 for that matter. To have avoided this result, a refined definition of the 
purpose, mission, and identity of NATO should have accompanied the process of 
expansion. If the alliance is to ever truly be "... an instrument of democracy, a defender 
of political and spiritual values...not a pact of nations against a more or less obvious 
enemy, but a guarantor of Euro-American civilization and thus a pillar of global 
security..."175 then further expansion must be postponed while the alliance, its members, 
its neighbors, its hopeful inductees, and its challenges like Russia take the time to 
redefine and reorient. 
2.        Failed Reorientation 
Starting in 1990, the USSR legitimately sought entry into the democratic, 
capitalist world and looked to the West for accession, appearing to be prepared to be a 
part of a U.N. Security Council consensus.176 The West, disappointingly, was not ready 
to take the lead with apprehensive Eastern European nations. It was easier to seek the 
military "appeasement"177 of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary than to begin to 
create a veritably unified, Eurasian security system and international community. 
Consequently, NATO's new mission and enlargement's voiced intentions have proven to 
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be hollow rhetoric as NATO, true to its long and proud history, has retained its purpose 
as a military alliance poised to counter a freshly nebulous threat from the East. 
To the Soviet Union and Russia alike, NATO has always represented a 
"stronghold of militaristic circles in the West."178 Russian leadership therefore figured it 
would be natural for NATO to dissolve with the Warsaw Pact as new security systems 
were built. This enduring national bias necessitates that Russia will orient itself against 
NATO as long as the organization is perceived to be a military bloc - in essence, as long 
as NATO's mission, purpose, and orientation remain unchanged. "Until such time when 
NATO is no longer a military bloc, the further expansion of the alliance to the East, ...is 
incompatible with the Founding Act.. .between the RF and NATO."179 
3.        Moving Past Article Five as the Defining Component 
The current situation is not unlike the one that was present during NATO's 
formation in 1948 when the Alliance had to include additional members in order to 
become a vehicle of an Atlantic community centering on economic and cultural rather 
than military concerns.180 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's present dilemma, 
similarly, is to find the measure through which it can mature past its role as a defense 
organization oriented against historical threat perceptions. Russia irreversibly views 
cooperation coupled with expansion as a stark contradiction. The paradox, effectively 
explained by Senator Sam Nunn in 1995 is as follows, "Are we really going to be able to 
convince the East Europeans that we are protecting them from their historical threats, 
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while we convince the Russians that NATO's enlargement has nothing to do with Russia 
as a potential military power?181 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright illuminated the paradoxical nature of 
expansion from another angle during a 1997 Senate Armed Services Committee meeting 
when she virtually promised U.S. intervention in Eastern Europe without Alliance 
inclusion. "If there were a major threat to the peace and security of this region, there is a 
high likelihood that we would decide to act, whether NATO enlarges or not. The point of 
NATO enlargement is to deter such a threat from ever arising."182 If this statement holds 
true and desiring countries are promised a NATO security guarantee while they augment 
their developing democracies, market economies, and military capabilities through the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), then why risk the inherent destabilization expansion will 
ignite with neighboring Russia? 
4. Scorecard 
Aside from the noteworthy advantages NATO's new members have been 
afforded since inclusion, only three of the seven officially stated objectives of 
enlargement have been met. A strong case can be made that the accession of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary has undoubtedly fostered democratic reform and stability, 
a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and investment, and a more coherent 
Europe as a partner for the United States183 with regard to the three nations involved. 
These benefits, however, are exclusive, as they have not yet been afforded to countries in 
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the immediate vicinities of the new members let alone the remainder of the security arena 
as a whole. 
The remaining four objectives have not only been neglected, but their antitheses 
have also been created. Instead of building stronger collective defense and the ability to 
address new security challenges, better burden sharing and contributions to Alliance 
missions, improved relations among Central and Eastern European states, and the 
avoidance of a destabilizing gray zone in Central and Eastern Europe,184 NATO 
expansion has antagonized Russia to the point of not eliminating, but simply moving a 
Cold War reminiscent dividing line and its inherent stability eastward. 
Many critics argue the existence of numerous additional objectives, the most 
prominent of which revolves around inclusion. In Europe, it is about being either "in" or 
"out." If a nation is "out," then domestic difficulties are sure to ensue. This 
phenomenon, unfortunately, has been demonstrated through the recent history of many 
Central and Eastern European nations. These fledgling democracies are presently 
suffering a swift political turn to the right, a sharp rise in the influence and power of 
communism/socialism, and a virtual social crisis of middle class descent into the lower 
strata and consequent exponential increase in divisions of wealth. 
A result of this apparent inevitability, almost all gray-zone nations fervently 
desire to belong to "Club NATO" for different and unique combinations of the following 
reasons: inclusion, Article Two guarantees of shared community and values, a 
leveraging measure for European Union (EU) accession, and Article Five collective 
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defense guarantees. Though Eastern European nations' desire for access and preservation 
of long-term interests is not refutable, it runs strongly contrary to Russian desires. 
Moscow, recently dethroned from being the capital city of one of two world 
superpowers, also almost desperately seeks inclusion into Europe. Yet with NATO 
surviving the Warsaw Pact as the security institution for the future, Russia's hopes have 
diminished. Expansion exacerbates this situation on two related levels. First, the more 
NATO expands, the more formidable adversary it becomes to Russia. Second, the 
diminishment of the gray-zone necessitates that Russia deal directly with its fully 
"encroached" NATO adversaries. In essence, not only does Russia remain excluded, but 
it has also lost its traditional buffer zone from the West. 
Consequently, Russia is socially, economically, politically, militarily, and 
strategically further from the West today than it was during the Soviet Union's last days. 
The paramount question one must ask, then, is verbalized by Senator Kempthorne (R) 
when he questions, "...whether NATO, as a military alliance, was the right vehicle to 
foster democracy, and whether enlargement would create, 'a situation where we would 
have to defend these new members, because we have inadvertently caused this sense of 
isolation with the very country...that still has the capability of destroying the United 
States of America.'" 
Overwhelming evidence seems to suggest that NATO expansion has, in effect, 
severely missed the mark and played a major role in rapidly reverting the puerile post- 
Cold War security system toward this volatile state of affairs. There is no ideal formula 
of what actions should have been taken in lieu of expansion to meet all seven stated 
objectives and result in a truly secure, peaceful post-Cold War international arena.  It is 
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clear, however, that it is past time to begin the search for an alternate route. Bipartisan, 
international, military, and political commentary has suggested myriad options since the 
initiative was first considered. These recommendations must now be intricately 
examined in concert with both recent successes and failures in an effort to find a means 
through which objectives can be met while the further destabilization of the security 
arena is curtailed.185 
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IV. THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 
The international security arena has remained in a perpetual state of flux since the 
latter part of the 20th century as nations have been chaotically attempting to redefine and 
realign themselves within a new world order. Russia has begun to pass from a state of 
rapprochement with and emulation of, to a state of disaccord with and emancipation from 
the West. This transition, because of the inherent volatility of its results, must be 
analyzed in depth and if possible, reversed. It cannot however, be looked at as one 
mutually exclusive event since it has involved a continual process that began in 1991. 
This chapter will argue that the Kosovo bombing, to date has had the most catastrophic 
effect on the security arena because of its arrival as the catalyst in an environment, which 
had been previously destabilized by the failure of economic reforms and the expansion of 
the Alliance. The interdependent causes and effects of this decade's reinvigorated 
distrust of and schism between East and West lay within the Russian psyche. Russia's 
inability to reorient towards the West in the face of nationally perceived U.S./NATO 
antagonization has given rise to the "new Russian youth" and their anti-Western 
inclinations. 
This analysis will begin with a brief illumination of how Russian fears of the 
West have changed from being psychological to being physical. The next four sections 
will analyze the main psychological effects that the Kosovo campaign has had on 
Russian-U.S. relations. The first of these sections will entail an in-depth analysis of the 
myriad aspects of Russia's quest for a place in the new security arena. The next section 
will briefly discuss the rise of American hegemony. The following section will describe 
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how Russia's fear of NATO has become one of an offensive military nature. The last of 
the four "psychological" sections will discuss Russia's alarm at losing the ability to effect 
and police its historic sphere of influence. The following section will discuss how these 
fears have transformed into a form of strategic destabilization with regard to Russia's 
new security concept and military doctrine, anti-Western alliances, and "new Russian 
mindset." The next section will detail Russia's inutile attempts at joining the 
international/European security arena in the midst of the above-mentioned events. 
Finally, with conclusions and recommendations, this study will attempt to propose viable 
ways through which the United States can reverse previously caused damage and reopen 
peaceful dialogue and cooperation with Russia in an effort to curb the nation's growing 
anti-Western orientation. The entire study will be conducted with the goal of determining 
why Russia now feels alienated. 
A.       FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL TO A PHYSICAL FEAR OF THE WEST 
For Russians, the Kosovo campaign turned many defining, psychological fears 
into realities. Cold War-learned, stereotypical paranoia, mistrust, and hatred of the West, 
that had begun to dissipate with bilateral cooperation, was revived in both the nation's 
social and political structures with immediate post-Cold War Western initiatives such as 
economic reform programs and NATO expansion, and crystallized by the Kosovo 
campaign. These newly forged fears included: a) Russia losing its place in the post-Cold 
War security arena, b) the United States creating a unipolar world in which it reigns as 
hegemon, c) Russia losing the ability to police its historical sphere of influence, and d) 
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NATO, seen as a defensive Western alliance, expanding east to soon include the Balkans, 
and certain nations within the Commonwealth of Independent States186 - Russia's historic 
sphere of influence. 
Although many attest that these fears can simply be disregarded as mere paranoia 
reminiscent of the last century's defining security arrangement, it was concerns similar to 
these that created both the debut and finale of the Cold War. Additionally, these same 
grievances today have begun to recreate a divided security arena that resembles more and 
more that of the past. Of the many concepts that have been used to describe the nature 
and promise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, one in particular - "to balance a 
resurgent Russia in a post-Cold War-world,"187 helped to transform this type of Russian 
resurgence from an unfounded fear to a "historically based" reality. Tragically, it is 
paranoid, stereotypical Cold War perceptions like these that make policy. 
1. Political Opinion 
One of the most alarming aspects of these fears is that they have virtually united 
all Russian politicians, from liberals to communists, in opposition to NATO.188 All of 
Russia's divergent political groups rallied together to denounce NATO's poised posture 
to strike Serbia. The Russian Parliamentary Duma adopted a resolution declaring the use 
of force  in Yugoslavia illegal unless  sanctioned by the U.N.  Security  Council. 
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Furthermore, the resolution stated that the Duma was ready to revise all existing 
agreements with the Atlantic Alliance.189 It is worth noting that the NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia, even in its declaratory phase, was powerful enough to bridge the gap of 
Russian political dissimilitude. 
2. Public Opinion 
It was no longer just the outspoken political elite, but also the "slumbering 
Russian public"190 who rallied against the Kosovo campaign. Public opinion surveys 
showed that 90% of the "people in the street" believed that NATO had no right to bomb 
Yugoslavia, 48% blamed NATO and Washington entirely for creating the crisis in 
Yugoslavia, and 70% interpreted NATO's military action in Yugoslavia as a direct threat 
to Russia.191 Within weeks, additional public surveys showed anti-American sentiment 
doubling from 23% to 49% and the favorable rating of the United States declining from 
67% to 39%.192 For one of the first times since the nation's rebirth, Russian citizens had 
come together freely against a perceived foe - NATO and the United States. This social 
fortitude, difficult to forcibly attain even under communism, caught the Western world 
completely off guard. As NATO research fellow, professor, and author J.L. Black states 
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in his work entitled Russia Faces NATO Expansion: 
.. .No one doubted that NATO expansion would have a powerful impact 
on the Russian political arena and on Moscow's political elite. In short, 
NATO's decisions about enlargement and "out of zone" policing activities 
were made in full knowledge that the Russian government would be 
unpersuaded and angered. The degree to which anti-NATO and anti- 
American feelings would well up in Russia's public domain, however, was 
unexpected at both the government and pundit level in NATO countries. 
... Furthermore, it is ironic that the old Soviet image of a rapacious West 
has resurfaced on Russian streets, and this time the sentiment is more 
spontaneous than orchestrated.193 
B.       RUSSIA'S QUEST FOR A POSITION IN THE SECURITY ARENA 
One of the main reasons behind Russia's current dissatisfaction is the nation's 
inability to accept its new role in the security environment. Russia seeks respect, as it 
believes it played an instrumental role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
furthermore, should not have to bear the guilt for all of the Union's atrocities. Most 
Russians, by now, begrudgingly accept that they no longer rate superpower status, but 
they continue to desire consideration as one of many great states in a multi-polar world. 
Alliance countries have not had the same read on the situation; they simply haven't felt 
they needed to worry much about brushing aside Russian concerns.194 In the past, 
conversely, it seemed as though the airing of Russian views was at least tolerated. Even 
in 1990, as the Soviet Union was fast in its downfall, Western allies made sure Russia 
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was kept informed in the final days leading up to the Gulf War. Yet with regard to 
Yugoslavia, "...not even lip service was paid to such niceties. ... As far as the West was 
concerned, there was no reason to consult Russia before taking action."195 Since its 
rebirth in 1991, Russia has found itself fighting for respect. 
Before continuing, it is essential to note the importance of Russia's position in the 
post-Cold War security arena. Simply put, without Russia, a new security architecture in 
Europe would not be complete. Spanning 10 time zones, Russia is a catalyst; what 
happens in Russia affects the entire region. According to Dr. Javier Solana, former 
Secretary General of NATO in a recent speech to the Oxford University Union Society, " 
... how Russia settles herself in this new Europe is perhaps the single most important 
issue of European security today. That is why our major Western institutions must seek 
to constructively engage this country."196 
1.        The Security Arena of Russia's Choice 
Russia has maintained an avid desire for inclusion in the new international 
environment, namely in Europe. From a cursory point of view, Russia's logical choice 
would be NATO, the world's most effective security institution. Yet because of NATO's 
historic raison d'etre - collective defense against coercion and aggression posed by the 
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Soviet Union - and the United States' role as archenemy and now aspiring hegemon, 
Russia cannot accept its ranking as being either under the alliance, or subservient to the 
United States. 
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs' Russia 2010 Report stated that 
Russia proposes a Europe without dividing lines, which will require a buffer zone of 
militarily non-aligned countries between the nation itself and NATO. The defining idea 
behind this security arrangement is an equal partnership between great powers and 
supportive geopolitical solutions.197 Col. Yurii V. Morozov and LtGen. Valerii K. 
Potemkin, of Moscow's Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the RF Armed Forces 
General Staff, proposed similarly that there should be a convergence of military doctrines 
within the framework of the OSCE as a "subset of the United Nations." The OSCE 
would need to be restructured and given a Security Council that would enable it to 
function efficiently. Russia's role as the bridge between East and West would therefore 
be secured.198 Many attest that the OSCE, the only truly pan-European body that has 
remained untainted by the Cold War, is the natural choice to lead the way in promoting 
stability and peace in Europe...."199 According to Gen. Kvashnin, an all-European 
system based on the OSCE framework would assure Moscow both an exclusive zone of 
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influence in the CIS and equal status with NATO and the United States.200 Though 
obviously unattainable in their entirety because of the desired equivalency with the 
United States, the most significant characteristic of these proposals is the fact that they 
concentrate on a Russian-European alliance, attentive to Russia's significance and absent 
the hegemonic role of the United States. 
2.        Resurgence of Dividing Lines 
Unfortunately, partially attributable to  an instinctive  dependence upon the 
simplistic identifications of the past, the quest for a new security arena has resulted in a 
self-fulfilling prophecy of Russian strategic alienation. With Cold War-attitudes still 
prevalent in positions of power in both the United States and Russia, a psychological shift 
could only have been expected as either the result of an alteration of initiatives and 
realities, or a change of generation. Neither one of these options was given sufficient 
time to develop. A simplified, black and white threat was preferred to shades of gray in 
both the 1950's and 1990's, and the Soviet Union/Russia was again automatically 
designated as the "archenemy."201 Though unfortunate, this choice is logical due to the 
fact that all for more than 50 years, psychological, physical, and fiscal energies were 
expended upon figuring out how each nation could impose mutual destruction on the 
other; cooperative engagement was not an area of concern. Consequently, Cold-War- 
characteristic dividing lines began to re-emerge again in Europe. 
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As described by Nadia Arbatova: 
Since nobody knew where Europe ended, the post-communist space was 
divided between two security institutions: the OSCE became responsible 
for the post-Soviet space, and NATO for the rest of post-communist 
Europe. It was the first psychological division of Europe after the end of 
bipolarity, which afterwards resulted in its practical division. 202 
3.        The Forgotten Player 
Many believed, because of the uncertainty caused by the end of the Cold War and 
the difficulties experienced in Bosnia, that NATO's credibility was inextricably tied to 
the results of the Kosovo conflict. As stated by NATO Secretary General Manfred 
Worner in the early 1990's: 
... the choice for the Alliance was between "out of area" or "out of 
business." NATO's raison d'etre was eroding because of the end of the 
Cold War. As the risk of a large-scale threat had disappeared, there was 
no longer a need for an alliance focusing only on collective defense. 
NATO had to transform. If not, it could die.203 
Henry Kissinger summed up the centrality of this fear when he stated that; ". 
...NATO could not be allowed to fail. If it did, the entire strategic architecture, linking 
American and European interests since World War II, would be in ruins."204 
This quest for the organization's future in the "here and now" consequently took 
complete precedence over the recreation of Russia's position in the post-Cold War 
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security arena. The fact that NATO's future was secured by the Alliance's actions in 
Kosovo, which were taken in direct and open disregard of Russian condemnation, sent a 
clear message to the East that the West did not see the new Russia as having a future role 
in the organization, let alone the overall environment. 
Simply put, the post-Cold War role of the most powerful security organization in 
the world was secured without a U.N. Resolution, in the face of denunciation from two 
Security Council members, and completely void of Russian influence or inclusion. To 
"humiliated Russians," 205 this growth of both NATO's size and sphere is a logical 
continuation of the contest between East and West. The historical fright that the United 
States and Western Europe will stand as one and check Russian influence at the door has 
been abruptly awakened. The mere fact that NATO excludes Russia means to Russians 
that NATO ignores their security interests.206 Add the Kosovo bombing to this anxiety; 
and Russians have begun to feel an acute solitude in a hostile world.207 
4.        The End of Russia's "Say" 
Before the Kosovo campaign, though Russia did not have a concrete position in 
the security alignment, it seemed to have a voice in both its seat on the U.N. Security 
Council   and   involvement   in   the   realization   of the   Founding   Act   and   PJC. 
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According to Dr. Alexei Arbatov: 
... The framework of International Security that had begun to emerge with 
the end of Cold War hostilities:" ... was based on an enhanced role for the 
UN and the OSCE. It assumed strict conformity with the U.N. Charter; 
compliance with international law; respect for existing agreements 
between Russia and the West (especially the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
of 1997), and a partnership between Russia and NATO, to include joint 
conflict-management and peacekeeping operations, as well as 
comprehensive arms control and disarmament regimes.208 
Russia's views about its involvement in the U.N. Security Council are easily 
explained. Russia's veto, a remnant of pre-Cold War "big five" relations, was the only 
internationally accepted thread that linked the nation to world decision-makers. Kosovo 
made that veto completely abortive; Russia had lost its only say and consequently been 
rendered silent with regard to international affairs. 
Discussions about the possible benefits that the Founding Act could bring ranged 
from those who saw it as a major accomplishment to those who saw it as empty rhetoric. 
According to its founders, the initiative was to commit at the highest political level to 
build a fundamentally new relationship between Russia and NATO. "They intend to 
develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency, a strong, stable, 
and enduring partnership...."209 The PJC, an integral part of the Founding Act, was 
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created to be, "...the principal venue of consultation between Russia and NATO in times 
of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability."210 
To many Russians, this was an incredible breakthrough. Inclusion in NATO was 
not anticipated, nor generally desired. The Founding Act appeared to provide a sufficient 
compromise. Russia would now take part in essential European decision-making and 
have full membership in the G-8, the Paris Club and the World Trade Organization. It 
was almost as if Russia had regained its place in the world - powerful and unique. 
According to Sergei Rogov, the Founding Act necessitated that: a) Russia's interests be 
considered at least "to a minimum extent," b) force would not be used when Russia and 
NATO differed, c) the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe was almost 
guaranteed, and d) Russia had a voice in European security issues through the PJC.211 
Dialogue from a meeting between Robin Cook, Hubert Vedrine, Klaus Kinkel, the 
outgoing German foreign minister, Albright, Holbrook, Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov, various OSCE representatives, EU chairmen, ministers, and aides, best illustrates 
that the first, second, and last of Rogov's hopes were destroyed with Kosovo. The group 
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was arguing about the question of force and the necessity of a Security Council mandate. 
Ivanov said, 'If you take it to the UN, we'll veto it. If you don't we'll just 
denounce you.' Kinkel says he wants to take it to the Security Council, as 
do the British and the French. Madeline and I say, 'Let's have another 
stab at it.' But Ivanov says: 'I just told you Klaus, we'll veto it... 'He 
says:' If you don't we'll just make a lot of noise ...' It was all 
foreshadowed.   The Russians can't do anything.   NATO is the power 
212 
The Kosovo campaign therefore demonstrated that the Founding Act was meant 
to pacify the Russians, not engage them. Additionally, once the bombing began, the 
rhetoric that had surrounded the Founding Act had lost its opaqueness; its transparency 
seemed boundless. As described by Black, "Crises in Yugoslavia therefore tested the 
degree to which the Founding Act would provide Russia with a role in NATO decision- 
making, and found it coming up very short."213 The Security Council had allowed 
Russia to retain its stature as a player in world affairs. Yet with the devaluation of its 
veto, Russia was left powerless. The Founding Act has failed to provide the struggling 
nation with a substitute as NATO and the PJC have proven themselves to be 
organizations within which Russian opinion counted for little.214 It is not only the 
majority of Russian politicians and government officials, but also Western experts who 
have come to identify the hollow nature of the Founding Act and PJC. Former U.S. 
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Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, admitted recently, 
the symbolism of the Founding Act - Russia's acquiescence in NATO's 
involvement in Central Europe in exchange for some Russian role in 
discussing security issues at NATO - was more important than the 
substance; so too was the role of the PJC, at least so far in its history.215 
5.        Neorealism 
These results are not out of the ordinary in the politics of the past decade. During 
the Cold War, the balance of power was unquestionably in effect. With the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and Russia's desire to retain influence in the international arena, a 
system of collective security was desired. For Russia, the acceptance of a position as 
"merely" one of many great states was a matter of pride and as it was, a difficult reality to 
come to terms with. The United States, however, as the only remaining superpower, had 
a different view of how things were to be. Since balance is unattainable when there is no 
power strong enough to counter one -nation's hegemony; neorealism took to the scene. 
As Martha Finnemore states in National Interests in International Society, realism doubts 
the relevance and existence of international law. "What order and rules exist in 
international politics survive because they are in the interest of strong states and are 
established and enforced by the strong."216 To the exacerbation of Russia's dismay, 
these "other strong states" had the tendency to kowtow to the interests of the United 
States; NATO had consequently become a mere tool of the West.    An insightful 
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description of this phenomenon can be found in Mikhail Gorbachev's book On My 
Country and the World when he states: 
... This war provides evidence that the United States, which plays a 
commanding role in NATO, is willing not only to disregard the norms of 
international law but also to impose on the world its own agenda in 
international relations and, in fact, to be guided in world relations solely 
by its own "national interests," taking the United Nations into account 
only if U.N. decisions and actions serve U.S. interests.217 
C.       THE DAWN OF U.S. HEGEMONY 
The Russian psyche has little room for American hegemony. After the parity 
attained throughout the Cold War-years, subordination to the United States is presently 
and will most likely continue to be deemed unacceptable. The national belief that Russia 
greatly assisted the decline of the Soviet Union and should have consequently played a 
significant role in the creation of the new strategic environment, significantly intensified 
the affront U.S. supremacy immediately became to Russia. As explained by Ian Thomas 
in The Promise of Alliance, "NATO did not resolve the problems of the East-West 
geopolitical and ideological confrontation called the Cold War. ... NATO simply 
survived long enough for these problems to disappear."218 
Juxtaposed with Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts at promoting a type of "new 
tliinking," NATO's survival doesn't quite measure up.    Russian views, therefore 
217
 Gorbachev, Mikhail.  On My Country and the World. New York, (Columbia 
University Press: 2000), p. 256. 
218
 Thomas, Ian. The Promise of Alliance, p. 176. 
101 
maintained that the nation should be given at least a cooperative parity with the United 
States. The United States, however, had quite a different reality in mind. "The U.S. 
position was that NATO could do what it liked."219 Russian political and popular 
opinion reacted fervently against such claims. As the Kosovo campaign brought the 
Russia/West rapport closer to the brink, Russian and Ukrainian communists started using 
the term "new world order" as a synonym for a Nazi-like attempt by the United States, 
via NATO to dominate the world.220 It was not only the communists, however who held 
these views. On the one-year anniversary of the debut of NATO's bombardment against 
Yugoslavia, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov assessed the Kosovo campaign as 
follows: 
This long-suffering region was just chosen as a kind of a test-site for 
trying the NATO-centrist concept of world order, where a group of states 
would misappropriate the right to dictate by force its will to the world 
community.221 
Opinions such as these became more prevalent as the campaign waged on; as noted 
earlier, Russian public opinion wasn't far behind. 
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D.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCRETE FEAR OF NATO 
What was most alarming to Russia was the fact that these hegemonic tendencies 
didn't stop at the rhetorical policy level. Russia's fear of envelopment was real; from the 
onset, the nation saw NATO expansion as a direct threat against the motherland,222 after 
Kosovo, that threat acquired teeth. The Kosovo campaign acted as the turning point for 
Russia/West relations. Though Russians felt slighted from the onset of the first round of 
NATO expansion, no real danger was sensed until bombs began to drop on the sovereign 
nation of Serbia without prior U.N. Security Council approval. Boundless Cold-War 
rhetorical "warnings" had been transformed into legitimate threats of force. Expansion in 
itself was undesirable and destabilizing, armed expansion was untenable. History has 
proven time and time again that past grievances can easily be fueled with actual policies; 
Kosovo reinforced this prophecy. 
A real sense of danger therefore immediately emerged after NATO began acting 
"out if zone" and outside the framework of international law and the U.N. Security 
Council.223 The foundation for this fear was twofold. First of all, as described by 
General Viktor Chechevatov, Commander of the Far East Military District, "The 
bombing of Yugoslavia could turn out in the very near future to be just a rehearsal for 
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similar strikes on Russia."224 Second, NATO involvement in the Balkans suggested to 
Russians that the Alliance was preparing to continue its creep Eastward to include both 
the Balkans and former nations of the Warsaw Pact and CIS. These fears, though 
exaggerated by political rhetoric, remain prevalent in numerous spheres and reflect a 
significant aspect of Russia's vision of itself and its future in world affairs.225 
1.        Perceived Intent of NATO's Eastward Move 
After the first round of NATO expansion, with the organization's zone of 
influence having already significantly crept eastward, thereby reducing Russia's warning 
time of an impending offensive, the idea of NATO in either the Balkans or the CIS, to 
Russians, seemed unpardonable.226 Furthermore, the combination of this new physical 
proximity, a result of the first round of expansion; the recently proven benefits of forward 
basing, logistical support, and over-flight rights granted by new-NATO and non-NATO, 
former Warsaw Pact states during the crises; and Russia's failed attempts at power 
projection in Pristina, a result of logistical deficiencies and a denial of over-flight rights; 
made the idea of NATO's further expansion almost debilitating. A central element of 
Russian perception is that NATO shelters desires of enlargement and unilateral out-of- 
area operations on the Balkans and the Caucasus, both considered to be vital to Russian 
national security interests.227 
224
 Johnson, David, "Russia Reacts to War in Yugoslavia." CDI Weekly Defense 
Monitor. 09 April 1999, p. 1. 
225
 Blank, Stephen J. Threats to Russian Security: A View from Moscow, p. 33. 
226
 Ibid., p. 15. 
227
 Ibid., p. 5. 
104 
To Russians, NATO's involvement in the Balkans was proof of that the 
organization's intended to continue its eastward trek. Though seemingly unfounded to 
most Americans, such sentiment was reality to the majority of Russians. The notion of 
an "inviolable red line" was raised to near doctrinal standards as threats of NATO air 
strikes abounded. As explained by Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to reporters in 
Moscow: 
There is a red line, which we regard as a cardinal change directly related 
to our security. This line goes along the border of the former Soviet 
Union, including the Baltic States. If matters come to this, we will have to 
fully revise our political relations with the North Atlantic Alliance, which 
we do not want to do, because we favor the continuation of 
cooperation.228 
Black gives historical reinforcement to this paranoia when he asserts that the 
official reason for the founding of-the Warsaw Pact was not the actual founding of 
NATO, which took place six years prior in 1949, but the Eastern movement of NATO to 
include West Germany in 1955. Supporting this assertion was a citation concerning a 
Soviet-sponsored Conference on European security conducted in Moscow in 1954 that 
involved a condemnation by the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania of the rearming of West Germany. The conference 
continued by threatening that new Soviet security measures would have to be taken if 
West Germany joined NATO;229 the Warsaw Pact was then established. 
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Although the Cold War-imposed "detente" replaced such defensive paranoia with 
concern over the possibility of isolation from Europe and its inherent loss of power, the 
reasons behind the constitution of the Warsaw Pact cannot be forgotten. Though 
unrealistic to assign full culpability for the creation of the Pact to NATO's West-German 
inclusion - this expansion can be seen as the stimulant. Background had already been 
laid by the events surrounding the genesis of NATO. The Kosovo situation provides an 
almost complete redundancy. With damage from the first round of expansion already 
inflicted, the Russian-rejected, U.N.-omitted decision to bomb Kosovo acted as an 
accelerant in the degradation of Russia/West relations. In short, Russians interpreted 
NATO actions in Kosovo as concrete threats to the nation's strategic interests. 
E.        RUSSIA'S LOST INFLUENCE OVER ITS HISTORICAL SPHERE 
Russia's consternation over most aspects of NATO expansion and the Kosovo 
campaign revolve around a fear of further marginalization and a major shift in the 
balance of power. Russia desires to be dealt with as a great nation with status 
commensurate to other powerful European nations. Russians want to break free from its 
inherited ranking as the Soviet Union's "fallen angel" and begin anew as a unique 
member of the European community. One example of this exceptionality is the 
significance Russia puts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Many of Russia's 
strategic priorities are linked to these nations, as they seem to be inextricably tied to 
Russia's sense of being. It is evident that reigning over this territory as was done by the 
Soviet Union is not possible, but Russia still desires an influential voice.   Gorbachev 
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described this unique global identity, which attempts to combine world unity with 
intensified diversity as: 
...a world of worlds, living side by side and interacting, with a mutual 
interest in preserving life-giving differences. Differences will become the 
meaning and purpose of human activity, if you will, a decisive factor in 
the survival of the species ... 230 
Russia's new near abroad seems to have become its "life-giving difference." 
Since the USSR functioned as a single unit, strategic, social, cultural, military, and 
industrial infrastructures were designed to empower the whole of the Union through 
Moscow. The destruction of the Union's interlocking system of states has therefore 
created seemingly insurmountable obstacles for Russia, the nations of the CIS, the near 
abroad, Europe, and the United Sates. "Russia had the longest standing as an influential 
player in all these regions, but now stood a good chance of losing its lead everywhere. 
Thus Russia is compelled to advance its interests unceasingly, wherever possible, in 
Eurasia."231 
1.        Russian Inability to Police Its Sphere of Influence 
In the midst of an arguably disastrous attempt at democratic transition, local wars, 
ethnic conflict, and organized crime surfaced in 1993 as Russia's greatest threats. 
Russian troops were currently involved in Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.232   As Russia weakened and the United States 
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strengthened, the fear of a growing American presence in Russian spheres of influence 
intensified. With the additional perturbation caused by later actions in Kosovo, Russian 
hopes for concrete bilateral cooperation had been nearly destroyed. This holds true 
because with Kosovo, the United States had made it clear that it would do as it pleased. 
Russian suspicions about American aspirations for control over the oil rich Caspian Sea 
region (using the Gulf War as a parallel) further aggravated the situation. An article 
published in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, though not representative of the 
Russian population in its entirety, provides a thorough explanation of this commonly held 
Russian paranoia: 
.. .it is not unlikely that NATO could use or even organize crises similar to 
that in Kosovo in other areas of the world to create an excuse for military 
intervention since the "policy of double standards" where the bloc's 
interests dictate the thrust of policy (the possibility of the use of military 
force in Kosovo against the Yugoslav army and simultaneous disregard for 
the problem of the genocide faced by the Kurds in Turkey, the 
manifestation of "concern" at the use of military force in the Dniester 
Region, Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh) is typical of the Alliances 
actions.233 
Another widely held fear resulted from this newly found American hegemony and 
its probable effects on what many Westerners view as nationally crafted human rights 
abuses in Chechnya. The Alliance's closer proximity to Russia, in concert with its 
determination to use force against a sovereign nonmember state, remains threatening to 
Russia partly because of its controversial involvement in the second Chechen War.  To 
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Russia, after Kosovo, the likelihood of NATO involvement in its near abroad and even in 
Russia proper seemed greater than ever before.234 
2. Paradoxical Justification 
Lessons learned from Kosovo through the observation of Western actions235 
could justifiably be summed up as: a) a powerful nation will reserve the right to take any 
measures it deems necessary to protect what it determines poses a risk to security, and b) 
that the use of massive force, without legal backing, and causing large civilian casualties 
in an effort to reduce the risk to military members is acceptable. Looked at from an 
eastern point of view, the Kosovo campaign created a paradoxical situation for Russia. 
Although NATO actions in Kosovo forewarned Russia of its own susceptibility to 
bombing, NATO's air campaign can also be interpreted as having validated Russia's 
actions in Chechnya. Serbians can be viewed as terrorists, so can Chechens. This 
oxymoron played a decisive role in the Russian government. First, it rallied strong 
Russian public support for the Kremlin's involvement in the second Chechen War. 
Second, NATO's proclaimed right to attack a sovereign state to secure its own aims 
seemed to validate Russia's use of force on its own territory for its own national 
interests.236 
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F.        FROM SENTIMENT TO STRATEGIC DESTABILIZATION 
To understand the significance of the previously analyzed fears, it is essential to 
note the centrality of the Russian self-image in post-Cold War relations. The dissolution 
of the Soviet Union stripped from Russians their ideological reason for being. 
Communism's ultimate demise left Russia with an immense void that spanned all aspects 
of existence, making the quest for a new national identity the nation's primary concern. 
The Kosovo campaign's physical manifestation of psychological threats soon overcame 
both the political and the public sphere, and rapidly transitioned from rhetoric to reality. 
The cause and effect of this destabilization was a growing schism between Russia and the 
West. This rift manifested itself in three main areas: a) Russia's new security concept 
and military doctrine, b) the initiation of non-Western strategic alliances, and c) the new 
Russian mindset. 
As discussed earlier, the re-appearance of an antagonistic Cold War orientation is 
transparent in both Russia's new security concept and military doctrine. In opposition to 
those released previously, which named no specific threats and had a pro-Western 
disposition, the new documents are expressly anti-Western and nuclear dependent. After 
the Kosovo campaign, strategists began to reevaluate an attack from the West.237 Experts 
began to discuss scenarios and actively plan. In essence, Kosovo moved the policy of 
nuclear first-use from a rhetorical affirmation to a necessary, routinely executed training 
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evolution. As proclaimed by Dr. Arbatov, "The initial hopes and plans of the early 90's 
are dead. Relations have been severely damaged in recent years. ... Russia views NATO 
as a threat to its own international peace and security."238 
The manner through which the international arena transitioned during the first 
decade of the post-Cold War period caused Russia to feel as if a new security arena was 
being built as it stood by stagnated. In response to recent NATO initiatives, "wherever 
the West won't take Russia seriously," Dr. Arbatov attested, "Russia will look for other 
partners."239 Since most pro-Western nations are already members of NATO or aspire to 
be so, this quest for multi-polarity has tended to ally the nation with anti-Western rogue 
states. 
Though one could easily dedicate an entire dissertation to the metamorphosis of 
Russia's overall external orientation, a pragmatic look at the situation illuminates that the 
substratum of the rhetoric is the key to the destabilization of today's security arena. An 
anti-Western, anti-NATO political and public outlook is the driving factor that 
necessitates implementation tools such as the strategic and military documents mentioned 
above. In essence, the history of Russia's reactions to NATO expansion and the Kosovo 
campaign shed light on the intuitive preferences that have and will continue to shape the 
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decision-making process in Russia.240 The greater danger is not that Russia's inability to 
deal with its diminishing influence has necessitated a nuclear confrontation, rather that 
the new Russia has yet to devise a strategy and policy based on reality.241 This 
phenomenon seems prone to continue since Russia's new generation has inherited a 
resurgence of an anti-Western, anti-democratic, anti-NATO character similar to that 
possessed during the Cold War. 
G.       RUSSIA'S FAILED ATTEMPTS AT WESTERN INTEGRATION 
Before concluding it is essential to note the efforts made by Russia in the midst of 
the previously discussed tumultuous campaign. Kosovo showed the West, not unlike 
Bosnia, that Russia did desire to play the game, and gave the West the answer as to how. 
Russia was eager to join the international community as a strong, proud nation of Europe 
and was additionally willing to participate in peacekeeping operations as long as it was 
invited into Kosovo by Yugoslav authorities.242 Russia was not, however, willing or able 
to be subordinated to NATO mainly because of what the organization continued to 
represent to Russians and arguably, Americans alike. Russia preferred to operate 
unilaterally with the United States, which, as the leader of the democratic free world and 
the driving force behind NATO decision-making and execution, could have proven to be 
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a viable option. In addition to the fact that it is preferable for the security arena as a 
whole to have Russia aligned with the West rather than the south, it can also be argued 
that Russia played a decisive role in ending the Kosovo conflict. 
Russia became a vital player in Balkan diplomacy as early as 1994 with the 
initiation of the Contact Group243 and continued to play a vital role throughout the 
conflict. Russia's assistance in limiting the number of casualties and terminating the 
conflict was a byproduct of both the nation's action and inaction. The air campaign could 
have turned out quite differently had the Russians given the Serbs their latest technology. 
As it was, the campaign ended up being a duel between 1970's Soviet technology and 
state of the art American technology. Conversely, if the Russians would have armed 
Milosevic with 1980's Soviet missile system technology (as Milosevic anticipated),244 
the coalition might have lost a significant number of aircraft, personnel, and consequent 
public support.245 With growing agitation over NATO expansion and the bombing 
campaign, recommendations that Moscow ignore the arms embargo against Yugoslavia 
and begin shipping weapons to Belgrade were made openly.246 Russia, thankfully, chose 
differently. The effects of this decision should not be taken lightly. Zivadin Jovanovic, 
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Serbian Foreign Minister asserted, "The failure of the Russians to back the Serbs to the 
end was, 'I admit, very relevant.'"247 
On the other hand, Russia's concrete assistance took both psychological and 
physical forms. First of all, by May of 1999, Chernomyrdin was telling Milosevic that he 
estimated NATO would escalate to a ground option if necessary and attested that Russia 
would not have been able to do anything to prevent this reality.248 More fundamental 
than the deliverance of this forewarning was the mere fact that Russia had decided to join 
NATO's efforts at coercive diplomacy to attain Milosevic's acceptance of the 
organization's core demands. 
At the time, Russian diplomatic assistance was not merely deemed helpful; it was 
necessary and its results decisive. In Kosovo: War and Revenge, Tim Judah includes a 
dialogue that expressly sums up the situation. "...Talbott, 'was getting sick and tired.' 
So, he surmises, he appointed Chernomyrdin, telling him; 'I don't care what you have to 
do, just end it, it's ruining everything.'"249 Diplomatic efforts took a serious turn for the 
better after Chernomyrdin's appointment - which ultimately proved a major reason for 
Milosevic's decision to accept NATO demands.250 Though a small piece of a large plan 
at creating a united front against Milosevic, the significance of Russia's actions is 
paramount. 
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Russian participation also opened the door to outcomes that could have had much 
greater effects than even the termination of the conflict. Russia's conciliatory diplomacy 
occurred after a significant amount of damage had already been done to Russia/West 
relations because of how the campaign had been waged. This ability to move beyond 
recent grievances and seek a compromise alluded to the fact that a strategic partnership 
with Russia was still possible. Objectively, since the Alliance not only requested, but 
also critically needed Russia's assistance after having disregarded the nation's strategic 
concerns, it can be concluded that the responsibility now rests with the West to 
"concede" in an effort to revive Russia/West relations. 
H.       THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN AS THE CATALYST 
The Kosovo campaign had significantly destabilizing effects on present-day 
Russian-U.S. relations. One must note however, that Kosovo alone cannot be given 
culpability for the degradation of the East-West rapport; it was merely the catalyst. The 
West had created an already volatile situation since Russia was forced to endure the near 
catastrophic failure of economic reforms and the affront of NATO expansion after having 
prostrated itself to the United States in hopes of immediate solutions. The Alliance's 
decision to bomb - which was made in the face of severe Russian protests and without a 
U.N. Security Council Resolution - sent Russia/West relations in a free fall. 
The Kosovo campaign invigorated the embers of four benchmark Russian fears: 
a) a loss of position, stature, and a U.N. veto in the post-Cold War security arena, b) a 
forcible submission to a globally proclaimed U.S. hegemon, c) the actual fear of an 
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armed NATO expanding further East, and d) the inability to police its historical zone of 
influence due to the risk of NATO deciding that it is in its interests to bomb a sovereign 
nation in Russia's near abroad. 
These fears have begun to be realized in three distinct strata. First of all, Russia's 
new security concept and military doctrine name NATO, the West and the United States 
as threats to Russia. Additionally, these documents not only reiterate and intensify the 
acceptance of nuclear first-use, but have also initiated the veritable, active preparation for 
the employment of this strategy. Second, feeling alienated by the West, Russia has begun 
to look south to anti-democratic, anti-Western rogue states instead of West to nations 
with "shared principles" for viable allies. The most devastating immediate effect of 
developing such strategic and economic relationships is the massive amount of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation that is ongoing.251 In Russia's present toppled 
economy, this type of "weapons industry" remains one of few profitable enterprises. 
Though many refute the credibility of Russia's anti-Western doctrinal shift, the 
identification of the third manifestation of Russian fears highlights the ominous nature of 
the situation. For the first time since the end of the post-Cold War and arguably ever, 
NATO has lost the Russian public. Often-refuted statements by hard-line Russian 
politicians would be easily disregarded if they were not a reflection of a renewed and 
growing assumption in the Russian public that all Western motives are suspect.252 
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The mood of the immediate post-Cold War years is long gone. The Kosovo 
campaign has solidified the revival of an anti-Western, anti-democratic psyche in 
Russians. Sovestskaya Rossiya, a leftwing Russian newspaper, though not reflective of 
the sentiment of all of Russia, describes the phenomenon quite accurately: 
The tumultuous protest rallies around the U.S. Embassy mark the entry 
into the political arena of hitherto 'slumbering' social forces. The 
bombing of Serbia has led to the radicalization of youth. The United 
States has suffered a massive political defeat in Russia: the fruits of its 
efforts over many years and the many billions spent on indoctrinating 
Russian youth in the spirit of 'Western values' were destroyed in a 
trice.253 
Granted, the mobilization of the political elite in Russia is nothing out of the 
ordinary, but the voluntary rally of the Russian population against anything that 
represents NATO and almost all that refers to Western, democratic, and U.S. prosperity is 
alarming. 
The end of this momentous period of post-Cold War detente is approaching. The 
United States not only has the ability, but also the responsibility to re-engage Russia in an 
attempt to democratize its economy and society. 
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I. FUTURE OPTIONS 
A solid point of embarkation would be an effort to create a working relationship 
between Russia and NATO like the one that exists between France and NATO.254 Since 
France pulled out of NATO's integrated military command in 1967, concerted efforts 
have been made to ensure French "appeasement" on most of the organization's internal 
and external crises. A perusal of NATO strategy documents illuminates the same 
finding. Though not a member of the integrated military command, French acceptance 
with regard to security concepts continues to boast primacy in the quest for consensus. 
1.        France and NATO 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has demonstrated a historical willingness 
to work within certain parameters to not only achieve French acceptance, but also involve 
France in all aspects of the process. The following three examples will seek to illuminate 
NATO's propensity to seek French approval as a key to consensus building: a) not only 
was French involvement essential, but certain sections of NATO's new 1991 Security 
Concept were actually given French signature,255 b) France not only participated fully in 
the Senior Group on Proliferation, but efforts were also made to include France in the 
Senior Defense Group on Proliferation - France was offered the first European co- 
chairmanship of the defense group,256 and c) France took part in the Long-Term Study 
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which led to Military Strategy 400/1 which integrated elements of NATO's new Security 
Concept and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept.257 
It is clear that a direct parallel cannot be drawn between France and Russia, as 
Russia is not an integrated member of NATO. Additionally, not withstanding the 
feasibility with regard to acceptance by other alliance members, messages of Russia's 
intent to join have been mixed. The point here is that NATO has shown its ability to 
discuss, debate, and at times even concede to France in order to build consensus within 
the Alliance. Conversely, while in the midst of the NATO expansion debate, Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, in an attempt to redefine the security arena 
and guarantee a place for Russia, presented an initiative for a direct link between the 
OSCE and the NACC. According to deWijk, the decision made regarding this proposal 
had nothing to do with viability or merit: 
...there was very little enthusiasm among the allies for a fundamental 
debate on the roles the various institutions should play in the new Europe. 
A majority of the representatives in the SPC (R) did not want to create the 
impression that the OSCE was being reinforced to make enlargement of 
NATO acceptable to the Russians. This would, after all, be an open 
acknowledgement of a major Russian influence on the enlargement 
process.258 
In effect, throughout the last decade, NATO decisions have been afflicted by a 
Cold-War stereotypical animosity toward Russia. Consequently, concessions NATO has 
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made for other "partially aligned" nations were not even offered to Russia. In essence, 
instead of "combining defense with dialogue" in order to, "...establish new patterns of 
cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region..." as stated in the 
Alliance's 1998 Security Concept,259 NATO has contributed to the destabilization of an 
immense nation, with untapped natural and human resources, and a significant nuclear 
capability. Paradoxically, such "...uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro- 
Atlantic area..." are named in NATO's above-mentioned Security Concept as security 
risks and challenges.260 
2.        U.S. National Security Strategy 
The Clinton administration's last official National Security Strategy, published in 
December 2000 states: 
Our engagement also helps frame the key choices that only the peoples of 
the former Soviet Union and their leaders can make about their future, 
their role in world affairs, and the shape of their domestic, political and 
economic institutions. Our strategy utilizes a long-term vision for the 
region, recognizing that this unprecedented period of transition will take 
decades, if not generations to complete.261 
The United States, often through the auspices of NATO, specifically with 
expansion and the Kosovo campaign, has definitely helped "frame the key choices" made 
by the Russians. Unfortunately, these key choices have been to: create new strategic and 
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military documents aligned against the West, encourage a weakened Russian military to 
actively train for nuclear first-use, and actively pursue anti-Western alliances (including 
WMD proliferation in violation of various arms agreements). 
With regard to the strategy's reference to "generations," the West has also played 
a decisive role. The blatant disregard and resulting intensification of Russian fears of: a) 
losing its position and veto in the post Cold-War security arena, b) being subordinated to 
U.S. hegemony, c) being pitted militarily against NATO with its continued plans for 
expansion, and d) being unable to remain engaged in and police its historical sphere of 
influence because of the possibility of NATO military action in the near abroad has had 
severely destabilizing effects on the Russian psyche. 
Though many would discount this as inconsequential rhetoric and declaratory 
posture, the result is that NATO, with the United States in the lead, has encouraged the 
radicalization of the Russian youth. The new generation of Russians has been given a 
defensive, anti-Western, anti-democratic, anti-NATO outlook reminiscent of that of the 
Cold War. If it is still possible to frame choices in this momentous period, the first step 
will have to be Western-initiated conciliatory engagement and dialogue on substantial 
issues. Without this, the West will continue to harbor its anti-Russian stereotypical 
preconceived notions and Russians will continue to intensify their anti-Western stance. 
With political and social spheres orientated in an increasingly antagonistic manner, 
consensus on strategic issues such as Kosovo will remain unobtainable; and the Russian- 
U.S. relationship will therefore continue to, "rot like a fish from the head." 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Through the implementation of numerous Clinton administration initiatives, 
"North America and Europe came together to shape the course of a new century."262 The 
problematic characteristic of these policies is that they have chosen to explicitly exclude 
Russia. As many American, European, and Russian experts have noted, "A Europe 
without Russia cannot be peaceful, undivided, and democratic"263 because the nation is 
too big, too nuclear, and too volatile to be ignored by the West. Consequently, to ensure 
the long-term viability of a peaceful post-Cold War security system, a modus vivendi 
must be found through which the West can both satisfy Eastern Europe and actively 
engage Russia. The expansion of the Alliance, combined with the West's overall 
demeanor toward Russia throughout the entire first decade of the post-Cold War, have 
successfully accomplished the former and neglected the latter. 
For a present-day, all-inclusive system to be effective, it would need to be 
decentralized, self-regulating, and comprised of actors who realize that they all have 
equal responsibility for its maintenance.264 It would also be susceptible to both U.S. 
leadership and Russia's ability to continue adequately its path toward the consolidation of 
its democracy and market economy.   To date, however, mainly as a consequence of a 
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Western inability to rid itself of preconceived, historical biases and partially as a result of 
Russia's inability to combat corruption, Russia has effectively been isolated from the 
post-Cold War security system. The effects of this alienation have already proven to be 
seriously destabilizing to Europe since 1999. 
The Clinton administration's policies toward Russia were typically based upon 
rhetoric, insufficiently funded, moralistic, and lacked clear objectives. As is historically 
true with U.S./Soviet negotiations, recent U.S. dealings with Russia have not aimed at 
enhancing mutual understanding because of an inability truly to reorient toward a non- 
adversarial Russia. This antagonistic approach has proven to be ineffective since Russia, 
at least in the early 90's, actively sought conciliatory dialogue, a veritable Russia/West 
alliance, and inclusion in the post-Cold War security arena. 
A.       LOSING RUSSIA 
Consequently, many Russians have lost their initial enthusiasm for Western 
principles, ideals, and practices. Initial efforts at building a market economy were 
characterized by Western aid acting as a substitute rather than a facilitator for economic 
reform. Though increased oil revenues have somewhat alleviated the situation created by 
the crash of 1998, the Russian economy continues to regress; the nation's present GDP 
accounts for only 1.7% of world GDP.265 Traces of true reformers are scarce if existent 
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at all while almost-absolute power is now concentrated in the Russian presidency, 
thereby neutralizing any vehicle for comprehensive debate on policymaking. 
The first round of NATO expansion has created anti-Western/anti-NATO/anti- 
U.S. political coalitions that the Russian public has voluntarily adopted as evidenced by 
the 1995/96 political platforms and elections. This newly forged Russia/West rift has 
manifested itself in: new antagonistic security concept and military doctrines that name 
the U.S. and NATO as potential adversaries and promote nuclear first-use for defense, the 
formation of anti-Western military, strategic, and technical partnerships and alliances. 
The most baleful effect of this phenomenon is the existence of a government that is 
rapidly reorienting towards authoritarian rule. The Kosovo campaign merely exacerbated 
these already tense relations as it intensified nationalist tendencies in the Russian body 
politic. In conjunction with the bombing of Serbia, NATO expansion: a) became a direct 
military threat to Russia, b) invoked historical fears of containment by encroaching on 
Russia's borders, c) stripped Russia of its place in world affairs by neutralizing its UN 
veto, d) hardened political and public resolve against NATO and the U.S., and e) 
intensified Russian efforts to avoid marginalization and isolation. 
The Clinton administration was well aware that NATO expansion could 
"...arouse Russian fears of NATO intentions, jeopardize President Boris Yeltsin's efforts 
to westernize and democratize Russian institutions, and push the nation down the road 
toward extreme nationalism."266 Along with U.S. skepticism was Russian 
"obstructionism" and strong European desire to "...approach the issue gradually and 
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allow time for reflection."267 Concern over Russia's reaction was so great that the 
official announcement setting forth the debut of the policy was intentionally postponed 
until after Russia's 1996 presidential elections. In light of Western apprehension, and 
through the guise of historical examples, Russia's reaction to NATO's first round of 
expansion was not only expected, but also not uncommon. 
B.       RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE COURSE 
During the immediate post-Cold War period, and specifically since Putin's 
inauguration, Russia has made many attempts to reverse the course of isolation that it 
believes the West has intentionally pursued. With Russia's rank in world affairs still 
uncertain, these efforts were made at an international level during Yeltsin's tenure. For 
example, Russia became a major player in Balkan diplomacy in 1994 after its initial 
aversion toward any form of U.S. involvement in Bosnia.268 Similarly, after official and 
popular reactions of "strident condemnation"269 toward the Kosovo campaign, "Yeltsin 
decided in mid-April [1999] to change tack, appointing his former Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin as his special envoy to the Balkans."270 President Putin has continued to 
make this type of attempt at inclusion; yet in recent months, with the tide having turned 
267
 Solomon, Gerald B.  The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997 - Blessings 
of Liberty, p. 80. 
268
 Daalder, Ivo. Getting to Dayton, p. 28. 
269
 Daalder, Ivo and O'Hanlon, Michael. Winning Ugly, p. 219. 
270
 Ibid., p. 28. 
126 
back toward further NATO expansion, the West has virtually excluded Russia from 
institutional world affairs. Consequently, Putin's efforts have been held mainly on a 
Russia+1 basis. For example, in response to the Bush administration's initial 
"independent" stance on the "moral obligation"271 to provide "fortress America" with a 
National Missile Defense shield, the Putin administration revoked its immediate 
condemnation and responded to the United States with requests to build a Regional 
Missile Defense shield. Though some critics would argue this dialogue to be a 
contradiction to the claim that U.S. initiatives have alienated Russia and destabilized 
Europe, Putin's demeanor can actually be seen as part of a logical struggle to vie for 
support and secure any role in international affairs. The nation has few, if any, choices 
on how to retain its status as a great nation. 
1. Putin's Policies 
Consequently, the main characteristic of the Russian president's efforts has been 
broad outreach into the "...vacuum of policy we have in the United States."272 A record 
year of more than 18 foreign trips and unprecedented travel within Russia has aimed 
primarily at neutralizing Soviet-era debts and opening markets for Russia's nearly 
bankrupt heavy industries. Putin has made significant efforts to move closer to Europe 
and has taken steps to: settle a dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands, encourage 
reconciliation of the Koreas, and move toward enormous weapons assistance to Iran. 
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This has all been in an effort to provide significant opportunities to the nation's economy, 
which continues to struggle through the transition from 70 years of communism to that of 
a market economy. 
Regardless of Russian alienation, Putin understands the necessity of U.S. 
involvement in Russian affairs, and therefore continues to pursue re-engagement through 
constructive dialogue with Washington. "Russia's foreign policy," he said, "will not 
include any great power chauvinism" and will continue to consider the United States 
"one of our major partners."273 Privately, though, many Russian officials fear that this 
sentiment is no longer shared274 and that Russia's perceived isolation and tertiary ranking 
(behind the U.S./ NATO and Europe) in world affairs are inevitable and demoralizing. 
C.       SUGGESTED FUTURE POLICIES 
In the opinion of this author, NATO should now: fully assess the policies of the 
last decade, identify the characteristics of the current situation, and map out more 
effective alternatives for the future. That NATO inclusion has had benefits of paramount 
significance for its three new member nations cannot be argued. It seems however; that 
these advantages have been rendered virtually inconsequential when compared to the 
destabilization Russia's continuous hostility towards expansion is charged with having 
had on European security. 
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Unfortunately, there is no ideal solution for the problem at hand nor does this 
study conclude that the United States and NATO should be given full culpability since 
the immediate post-Cold War years were filled with a plethora of first-ever uncertainties 
for which no nation was prepared. The mistakes of the Clinton-era, though significant, 
are reparable. 
The question therefore, is which policies can the West provide Eastern European 
nations with requisite security guarantees and political, economic, and social benefits 
without further destabilizing Russia's relationship with the West. Western strategic 
priorities should therefore aim at Russian inclusion in an effort to guarantee that Russia's 
nuclear power will be neutral, if not pro-NATO in the future. Russian inclusion is the 
easiest way through which to accomplish this; yet a consequence of Russia's unique 
identity, the ways through which the nation must be successfully engaged are yet to be 
determined. The following set of opposing courses of action and precondition for their 
success are therefore provided as reference points from which Russian policy formation 
should be reinitiated. 
1.        Option One 
The first viable option involves an intricately woven network of Western 
institutions centered on a yet more powerful PfP. First, the PfP must be strengthened in 
ways that render the institution's security guarantees formidable enough to ease Eastern 
European nations' fears while refraining from agitating Russia. In doing so, the PfP must 
retain its component of flexibility and continue to pursue individual relations with each 
member nation on a 19+1 basis, as this has proven effective in ensuring that each nation's 
specific security guarantees can be explicitly met. 
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Second, the EU must become the organization responsible for providing 
economic stability and promoting and facilitating nations' transitions toward a market 
economy. This aspect would not encounter much Russian resistance as the foreign policy 
concept of the Russian Federation proclaims the EU as being of "prime importance." As 
"one of its political and economic partners...[Russia] will strive to develop with it an 
intensive, stable and long-term cooperation.. .275 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization would then be responsible for providing 
assistance to both institutions whenever necessary. A free-flowing, trilateral relationship 
between these three institutions must be created in an effort to ensure transparency and 
cooperation. Though difficult to implement because of Russia's negative view of NATO, 
such cooperation seems plausible in light of the March 2000 initiation of a 
Russia/EU/U.S. mechanism developed to enhance relations with the EU and secure 
necessary U.S. interaction.276 
Russia, already a member of the PfP and engaged in partnership with the EU, 
would then be guaranteed an active role in the world's premier institutions without 
NATO membership. With U.S. promotion of the initiative, this interlocking system of 
organizations could be the answer to being considered "in, " without continuing to erode 
the international arena through the deterioration of Russia's rapport with the West. The 
continued expansion of NATO would become moot, as member nations would be granted 
Article Five guarantees.   The system would therefore assure Eastern European nations 
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through a more robust PfP, placate Russia through concrete inclusion, and preserve the 
efficacy of NATO and the stability of the trans-Atlantic arena as a whole. 
2.        Option Two 
The second option involves the abandonment of future full membership for partial 
or associate membership - security affiliation without military integration. It is not 
realistic to expect many aspiring nations to be able to fulfill partnership requirements as 
originally set forth by NATO when such a feat was not attainable by Poland, the Czech 
Republic, or Hungary. Additionally, extra capital would be better spent on social and 
economic measures than on the buildup of military infrastructure. Partnership could 
therefore be redesigned to permit early membership under Article Five of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. This automatic assurance of full security for aspiring nations would 
negate the need for military exercises or SHAPE involvement to entice such security. 
Furthermore, with Russia's present social, economic, and military strife, the nation is no 
longer considered an immediate threat. Consequently, it is not necessary to station 
NATO forces on the nation's borders, for as long as NATO retains its present capabilities 
it will be able to effectively respond to any threat.277 
In essence, history suggests that the Alliance can build confidence, consensus, and 
effective diplomatic relations without direct military involvement. The example of 
France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command (1996-7) as detailed in 
chapter Four provides an ongoing example of how influential nations can refrain from 
military involvement in the defense of Europe while remaining protected under Article 
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Five and without incurring the organization's demise. Iceland and Spain can also be used 
as examples since both nations are fully protected under Article Five yet the former has 
no military and the latter's military is not integrated into SHAPE. 
In this way, without the military aspect, NATO could expand and protect all 
aspiring nations while remaining non-threatening to Russia. Russian President Yeltsin 
practically promoted this sort of expansion in both 1994 and 1996 when he recommended 
to, "...do it like the French: becoming a member of the political committee without 
joining the military organization."278 In sum, inductees must gain a position "outside a 
military structure but inside a security system"279 in an effort to quiet historical fears 
while avoiding further destabilization. Although this option strips the threat from NATO 
expansion, the inclusion of Russia in the international system would still be an issue. 
Since Russian accession grows increasingly unrealistic, a new rapport outlying Russia's 
special status yet not alarming Eastern Europe would be a requisite "partner element" for 
this "new NATO." 
3.        Finding the Right Institution to Act as the Russia/West Bridge 
Many experts, Eastern and Western alike, suggest exploiting the OSCE to serve as 
a vehicle to build a comprehensive treaty between NATO and Russia. Though the 
organization's inability to conduct security operations in Kosovo has placed it in a 
perpetual role of non-military peacekeeping and democratization assistance, Russians 
believe the OSCE has retained its potential as a forum for dialogue and decision-making. 
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Where Russians diverge from most Westerners, however, is that they regard the OSCE as 
the institution capable of conducting preventative diplomacy for all of Europe. In sum, 
Russia believes that the OSCE should act as the coordinating link between all European 
institutions.280 Many Western organizations and governments, on the other hand, 
consider the PJC, as is, to be an effective consultative body. According to the 50th 
Anniversary NATO Handbook, "The Permanent Joint Council has already become an 
important vehicle for building confidence, overcoming misperceptions, and developing a 
pattern of regular consultations and cooperation,"281 when in all actuality the Council is 
more rhetoric than reality. Consequently, if the PJC is to be the means, then it needs to 
be further empowered by NATO. 
First, NATO must broaden issues for consideration to include Russia-internal and 
NATO-internal issues. As it stands, the wording, "Consultations in the Permanent Joint 
Council do not extend to internal matters concerning NATO or its member states or 
Russia,"282 leaves a loophole through which either side can conceivably avoid pertinent 
issues. In the interest of increased transparency, this "workaround" should be eliminated. 
The Council needs to become one of permanent, regular nature with manned offices in 
Brussels and daily contact between representatives.    Once-a-month meetings at the 
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ambassadorial level283 are not sufficient. Another good recommendation for action is the 
creation of a more direct link between the PJC and the NAC that Russia could utilize 
when consensus on problematic issues is reached. In essence, if the PJC is going to be 
the means through which NATO and Russia achieve a viable post-Cold War rapport, the 
council needs to surpass rhetoric and transition into a concrete medium through which 
Russia can have a legitimate "voice without a veto." 
The debut of the above-suggested policy of engagement should occur in three 
steps. First of all, the United States should hold a presidential summit on a broad range 
of issues at a U.S. location. This U.S.-hosted summit should be immediately followed by 
a Russian-led summit to be held somewhere in the Russian Federation.284 The next level 
of negotiations must include: Presidents Bush and Putin, Secretary of Defense Colin 
Powell and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Chairman of the Senate 
Arms Services Committee and his counterpart, and any other teams deemed necessary. 
Subjects for discussion should only be limited by mutual agreement between all members 
involved. The final step should be a similar, comprehensive summit on the G-7/G-8 level 
at a neutral location.   Throughout this process the United States must also publicly 
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commit to stability within Russia and encourage international assistance for continued 
democratic and economic reform. 
Only after this basis for mutual understanding and cooperation has been built can 
further improvements be made. Yet before initiating this new U.S./NATO policy of 
Russian engagement, objectives must be clearly stated by both sides. Suggested 
objectives should include: transparency, conciliatory dialogue, the international 
reinstitution of Russia as one of many great powers, concrete improvements in Russia's 
economic and democratic "revolutions," political, military, economic, and social 
cooperation, and a non-threatening agenda resulting in the concrete inclusion of Russia 
(without a veto) in all European institutions. 
4.        NMD as the Catalyst 
The last aspect necessary for a medium similar to this empowered PJC to gain 
efficacy is a significant issue on which to begin dialogue, coordination, development, and 
eventual implementation. The Bush administration's proposal to build an NMD shield 
has plausibly become this issue. In essence, this initiative, acting as the catalyst, could 
terminate the continued destabilization that Western-led economic reform, NATO 
expansion, and the Kosovo campaign have caused and with time, also begin to evolve 
into true appeasement and eventual alliance. 
Russia initially and unconditionally condemned NMD after its announcement 
because it would violate the ABM Treaty. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has 
repeatedly countered with the administration's willingness to proceed with the initiative 
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even if it could not overcome Russian, Chinese, and European objectives.285 
Surprisingly, in response to the definitive U.S. position, Russia softened its initial 
denouncement and suggested active involvement in building a cooperative European anti- 
missile defense system - an alternative that would stay within the bounds of the ABM 
Treaty. In late February, Russia presented NATO plans for this system286 and in contrast 
to U.S. passivity in response to this compromise; Russia has continued to pursue this 
genre of program. Defense Minister Ivanov recently made public Russia's latest proposal 
of creating two working groups with the United States to discuss strategic questions 
involved in establishing missile defense systems.287 The most difficult step - getting 
Russia on board - has conceivably already been taken. 
The upcoming meeting between the two Presidents in Slovenia on June 16 
presents the United States with a prime opportunity to take back the initiative on NMD. 
Even though Putin's desire to wipe away Soviet-era debt and revive loan commitments 
from the IMF could be used as leverage, such concessions would arguably be well worth 
both their plausible benefits and the difficulties that refusal could initiate. Russia and the 
United States could forge a new, bilateral, cooperative relationship for the first time since 
285
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relations began to deteriorate after the Kosovo campaign. Tied to debt liquidation and 
loan reconstitution, a partnered missile defense program could bind Russia to cooperative 
Western engagement, strengthen the nation's economy through increased 
interdependence, encourage democracy through the promotion of a western ideal, and aid 
in the long-term stabilization of trans-Atlantic security. On the other hand, if this 
opportunity is not taken, Russia could rejoin with Chinese opposition and refute the 
initiative in its entirety, in effect clearly dividing Europe and reinitiating an arms race. 
5.        Bush Administration Policies 
Whatever route is taken, the past suggests that the United States must take the 
lead in building a rapport of transparent engagement with the Cold War's "defeated 
power." The Bush administration's exceedingly harsh rhetoric toward Russia in addition 
to the fact that neither President has visited the other during the first five months of 
President Bush's term, have undoubtedly been steps taken in the wrong direction. Many 
critics describe Bush's initial stance toward Russia as a hard-line, directive approach. As 
described in a recent New York Times article: 
His presidency has introduced a distinctly negative tone toward Russia, 
amplified by a contentious espionage dispute and policy debates that seem 
headed toward a significant downgrade of relations.288 
Fortunately, however, Bush's strategy seems to have subdued into one directly 
contrasting that taken during the administration's early weeks when the President and his 
National Security Advisor said they were prepared to speed ahead alone to undo the 
288
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ABM Treaty.289 Conversely, Ms. Rice recently stated, "We want to convince the 
Russian's that it is in their best interest to move beyond the ABM Treaty and to develop a 
new relationship with us.290 This appears to reflect that the administration's stance has 
doubled back to one of conciliatory dialogue. According to senior administration 
strategists, to win Russia's approval, the staff is preparing an offer of arms purchases, 
economic aid, military aid, and joint anti-missile exercises. 
Critics of these "carrots" claim that the newest proposals are insufficient in two 
areas. First off, they fail to address Russia's main concern of ensuring that there are 
clearly defined limits on the development and deployment of the system. "The bottom- 
line for Russians is that a defense has to be limited," remarked Joseph Cirincione, senior 
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "They can't go along with 
an open-ended defense that has the potential to overwhelm their deterrent."291 Second of 
all, few of the suggested benefits are new and many are already in effect. For example, 
two joint exercises have already been held in Colorado and Moscow, the Clinton 
administration and the Kremlin reached an agreement to share early warning data on 
missile launches in 1988, and it was Moscow's idea to sell S-300 antimissile systems for 
installation in Europe. 
The administration's proposals appear to be insufficient; and it is not only 
Moscow who feels this. Democrats are about to take control of the Senate and skeptics 
289
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of NMD are presently in control of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committees; making money for NMD difficult to obtain without Russian acquiescence. 
Furthermore, at a recent meeting of NATO Ministers held for the purpose of persuading 
NATO on the antimissile plan, the allies, afraid of NMD initiating another arms race and 
skeptical about technological feasibility, refused to even declare that they faced the 
"common threat" necessary to warrant NMD.292 Unlike the days of the Cold War, when 
Europe was less unified and Germany not assertive, Washington can no longer impose its 
will upon NATO with regard to missiles.293 As holds true with initiatives taken during 
the first decade of the post-Cold War, NMD will not add to American security if it 
undermines the cohesion of the Alliance and in turn, Europe. 
In sum, if the administration's real thinking is that, "...there was little Moscow 
could or should be able to do about it [NMD],"294 then the rhetoric is more important 
than the reality, as it was during the Clinton years and appeared to be when the Bush 
administration took office. And if present U.S. diplomatic efforts toward Russia are 
intended to be no more than a feint as it seems they were with initial economic aid, 
NATO expansion, and the Kosovo campaign, then the gulf between Russia and the West 
will continue to expand until it becomes unbridgeable. Perhaps then the hollow benefits 
that expansion has had on European security will become fully evident. 
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